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Jill Lepore
Professor of American History and Law; Staff Writer, The New Yorker, Harvard University

Dr. Jill Lepore on why AI backlash is vital | Decoder

📅 Jul 20, 2026 Decoder with Nilay Patel 56 MIN 8895 VIEWS 66 SEGMENTS · 3 SPEAKERS
Dr. Jill Lepore is one of the best writers there is at identifying institutional patterns in history, and Decoder is a show about systems and organization — so her new book, The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State, is a perfect fit for the show. You build systems by measuring things — gathering information, quantifying it as data, and taking action on it. The book's big thesis is that this kind of systemic measurement is really a dehumanizing act, one that flattens humanity and human concerns into something, well, artificial. These artificial structures touch everything — not just in the m...

Questions asked in this interview

10
  1. 0:37If you can't even get Yale to take a beat and talk to you, what else is there?
  2. 5:27Is that the core of the idea?
  3. 9:02Yeah, the book traces this evolution step by step as you're describing, right?
  4. 16:26And I see that kind of over again in your book, in the culture that we live in at large, that deciding what to set aside is the big decision, right?
  5. 23:48But it's that dynamic that I struggle with, right?
  6. 30:13Do you think the identity politics of today is defined by the fact that we all exist on platforms, or do you think it's just shaped by it? What's the relationship there?
  7. 34:17I'm wondering how you see that connecting to the artificial state, right?
  8. 40:44... deploy bots out onto the internet on my behalf, should they have the same rights as I do, or do you actually need me and all the friction that I come with in order to build a business model and do you have a right to that business model?
  9. 41:45But I think people like Instagram and I don't think they're going to give up their phones, right?
  10. 51:40And they know that it won't or is this actually a moment for democracy to reassert itself because they're asking for it?
Nilay Patel 0:00 ↗
College students boo AI at graduation ceremony after graduation ceremony. That seems like if there's any kind of market pushback that leads to a political pushback that leads to actual change, that's where it comes from. And that still came from the internet itself.
Jill Lepore 0:15 ↗
No, it came from those people in a quad in their sweating and their stupid caps and gowns making a lot of noise together. I teach undergraduates, like I see them go out in the world. There are no jobs for them. You want to be a writer, you want to be an artist, you want to be a movie maker, you want to be a screenwriter. Where are you going to get a job? Who's going to? The whole culture industry is imploding.
Nilay Patel 0:37 ↗
If you can't even get Yale to take a beat and talk to you, what else is there?
Yeah. I don't know, man. That is really grim. I mean, I think if I...
Jill Lepore 0:47 ↗
No, you're supposed to depress me around.
Nilay Patel 0:54 ↗
Hello and welcome to Decoder. I'm Nilay Patel, editor-in-chief of The Verge. Decoder is my show about big ideas and other problems. Today I'm talking with Harvard professor and New Yorker staff writer Dr. Jill Lepore about her new book, The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State, which comes out on August 25th. Jill is one of the best writers there is at identifying institutional patterns in history. And Decoder is a show about systems. You build systems by measuring things, gathering information, quantifying it as data, and taking action on it. And Jill's thesis in The Artificial State is that this kind of systemic measurement really dehumanizes people. It flattens us and human concerns into something well artificial. These artificial structures have grown to touch more and more parts of our lives. From the first stabs at taking a census thousands of years ago to the invention of modern political polling in the 1930s. But where she really sees a big pivot and the era she and I talked about the most is in the 1980s when we saw the emergence of the Silicon Valley culture we have today. What Jill and I did disagree about is some of her pessimism about the internet because the internet is what made jobs and careers like mine and businesses like The Verge and shows like Decoder even possible at all. There was a really great democratizing of access that happened in the late 20th century and into the 21st as people got online. And not all of it was elucery as maybe the great hopes for Twitter after the Arab Spring turned out to be. But as I said, Jill thinks in systems. So her response about the way systems of power keep adapting to how people use new technology was as illuminating as ever. Of course, we also talked about the future and where she sees hope for that future. And yes, that includes college kids booing the AI CEOs at graduation ceremonies. Okay, Dr. Jill Lepore on The Artificial State. Here we go. Dr. Jill Lepore, you're a staff writer at The New Yorker. You're a professor of history and law at Harvard University. And most importantly, you're the author of a new book, The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State. Welcome to Decoder.
Jill Lepore 2:40 ↗
Hey, thanks for having me.
Nilay Patel 2:42 ↗
I am really excited to talk to you. I'm a big fan of your work over the years and I have to say this book is one of the most Decoder, Verge, Nilay Patel strike zone books of all time.
Jill Lepore 2:54 ↗
Wow. I'm not sure how to take that, but I guess that's good.
Nilay Patel 2:57 ↗
Yeah, the producers and I just had a thrill ride reading this book. It is essentially about how computers and measurement flatten us and then systems can take advantage of that flattening. And that is, like I said, it's in the strike zone. So let's just start at the very beginning for folks. The book is called The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State. Tell us what the artificial state is. Define it so we can start from that foundation.
Jill Lepore 3:21 ↗
What I mean by the artificial state is a kind of successor to the liberal nation state, the constitutional democracy under which, you know, our freedom of speech and free discourse and our constitutional rights are central to our experience as citizens within a nation state. We talk a lot about democratic decay and democratic backsliding and, you know, there's a whole public discussion of what's happening with democracy, but I don't think we talk about the nation state as much as we might. That is to say, the state itself. So what I mean by the artificial state is a state in which more and more of the functions of the nation state have been taken over by private multinational corporations. And the easiest example of that to think about is, you know, what is sort of euphemistically called the public square, which is where people get information about how to vote and what's going on in the world and how to make decisions and how to exercise their rights and duties as citizens. Our public discourse is really almost entirely privatized and owned by corporations who, you know, as many many people have demonstrated, it's not news to your listeners or to anyone, that public discourse, the priority is not the free expression of ideas and democratic deliberation. It is the monetization of attention and of outrage. And more than that, a fairly recent vintage is the fact that public platforms on which we exchange ideas as citizens and democracies are dominated by bots, right? They were all of them have been inverted for several years now or different numbers of years. You know, from X to Facebook to TikTok, there are far more bots than humans on those platforms. And those bots are, many of them are owned by corporations and have particular acts, their own kind of financial interests, but they're owned by state actors and non-state actors and criminals and terrorists. And so I think what we're at risk of is losing the liberal constitutional democracy and having it become supplanted by what I describe as the artificial state.
Nilay Patel 5:27 ↗
So, one of the things that really struck me about this is at least America's conception of itself, the United States' conception of itself is this messy multi-art democracy. The Senate loves to call itself the most deliberative body in the history of the world. And it's supposed to be a whole bunch of people that are ruled by the consent of the government and we're all arguing. And your thesis is, yeah, that's what we say about ourselves. But actually we've automated away and numerically quantified away a bunch of that and we are now run maybe by bots on Twitter or at least politicians are overwhelmed by bots on Twitter and they've outsourced their thinking or there's consultants that are turning us all into polling data. Is that the trajectory we're on that ends the nation state? Is that the core of the idea?
Jill Lepore 6:16 ↗
Yeah. And I think it has a long history, but the acceleration of these developments in the age of artificial intelligence is really considerable. So you could say here, I'll give you two examples that kind of maybe stretch out across a century. So 1930s, the 1930s, the invention of so-called scientific polling. George Gallup starts the American Institute of Public Opinion research in 1935. What polling does gradually over the middle decades of the 20th century is replaces the kind of door-to-door precinct walking that, you know, campaigns would need to do, right? If I want to, I'm running for election in some neighborhood, I got to go talk to people, got to go to baseball games, you're going to, you know, go to basketball games, got to go to the public library. But increasingly it became less necessary for political campaigns to do that because they could subcontract out political polling, right? But you can find out what political opinion is in a neighborhood if you want to run a campaign by just drawing down, just by doing data mining and data analysis. So we might say, okay, well that makes politics so much more efficient, right? Like those campaigns can more efficiently use their money and they can get their message out to the right people. But if you think about each one of those conversations that people used to have, right? I'm a campaign volunteer and I'm going to go and I'm going to sit in on some PTA meeting or I'm going to go to a basketball game in some neighborhood and like talk to the parents who are there. All those conversations are kind of the civic glue that kind of holds a civil society together. And so replacing those just kind of like chatting by the side, you know, under a street lamp about what do you think about this guy? With just extracting data, which is where we are now, it's just a much more artificial politics than we have had before. And then if you kind of project ahead to, I mean there's been kind of great coverage lately of emerging trends for the 2026 election in the US and around the world where a lot of people report that even in these primaries, you know, that have been going on over the spring and summer. They'll ask ChatGPT like, who, how should I vote in the primary? Meanwhile, the campaign messages that you're getting have many of them been crafted by artificial intelligence, right? And the fact that you are getting them is a decision made by artificial intelligence. So, in a way, it's like AI versus AI in these upcoming elections or even in elections that are already transpiring. You can see how you could fall into that like step just sort of just going downhill on skis, but I kind of wanted to write a kind of grumpy book to say, well, let's pause for a minute. Like, when does what's at the bottom of that hill? Like, is that an icy pond we're going to just go through the ice and like we're all going to drown in there or is that like a beautiful new political world? And I think it looks pretty perilous.
Nilay Patel 9:02 ↗
Yeah, the book traces this evolution step by step as you're describing, right? This is a slow build to maybe where we've gotten today. And you point out several times in the book, you know, there's a bunch of science fiction authors in the 50s and 60s who are looking at computers and they're drawing a picture of the future. And some of them pick utopia and there are entire movements about technocratic utopia that emerge and a lot of them pick dystopia. They draw a picture of computer-aided dystopia and you point this out. I mean everyone has heard the torment nexus meme. It's in the book. You use it in the book that our modern industrialists have read dystopian science fiction and decided that is the model of the future that they're attempting to build. I'm curious why you think they've all gotten it wrong from Elon Musk to Peter Thiel on down and if that is a moment, an inflection point for us to actually pick a different future.
Jill Lepore 9:56 ↗
Like it's kind of a big thing starting in the 30s to imagine a future in which the president of the United States is chosen by a machine. There are a bunch of examples of this from the 30s, you know, where people are really worried about totalitarianism and the dehumanizing of people as a consequence of the machine age, but there's also a lot of it in the 1950s. So there's for instance like a classic story by Isaac Asimov that I think is 1955 called Franchise. It's set on the days before election day 2008, November 4th, 2008, the day Obama won the presidency. And in that imagined future, that Asimovian future, there's this machine called a Multivac that determines using polling data who in the United States is the average man, the most representative man. Like the sampling method that pollsters use has been perfected mathematically by this computer can pick the average person. And that's the only person who votes. And then that guy has to go into hiding because if people don't like who was elected or the presidency goes badly, like his life is destroyed. So there's a lot of this stuff in science fiction, but who, maybe last year Sam Altman was I think on Joe Rogan and he started talking about how great it would be if AI chose the president of the United States. Like, and he wasn't, I mean yes he was like around, but he was also serious, right? Like wouldn't that be great because it's so efficient and we don't have to bother and it spares us the labor. And that general premise that like why would we bother to do something that a machine can do for us without the realization that I think the rest of us would have, like but there's some things we want to do including like meaningful work, right? Including write and make art and do things for ourselves. I know you know these are very smart people, but they're not humanists and they seem to have, I mean Thiel would say he is, right, that he's a political philosopher. I'm not so convinced of that. Like I think that the capacity for humanistic inquiry and humanistic reading and humanistic reasoning is not something you see in great evidence in that culture. And I think it's been really kind of bred out in a way of the culture of Silicon Valley that even if you look back to the 90s and the culture of, you know, this celebration of the serial entrepreneur as the new man of progress, that particular kind of cultural formulation was all about the disavowal of the past, right? It doesn't matter what came before. You want to start a ride service, you don't study taxis or figure out where the delivery service came from. You don't look at traffic patterns. You don't study anything in the past. You just start new. You just imagine it all new and you destroy what came before. Such a rejection of the knowledge and wisdom of earlier human beings. Like the posture of the humanist is one of kind of humility. Like, isn't it magisterial and majestic how, you know, Homer wrote the Odyssey so long ago and it's still so powerful and the kind of timelessness of literature and the arts. The infinite beauty of humanity's capacity for making things. That's just kind of the ethos, right? Like it's like, no, we'll do it better. Doesn't matter what anybody did before. It's we're innovating. We're disrupting. It's like the culture is just so fetishized on the future that it doesn't have that like let's listen to what other people who came before might have known. That's still wisdom. And that makes for a very poor reading of literature, right? Like we could have a great argument about what Isaac Asimov meant by that story. Like it's not like a determinate authority on Isaac Asimov, but like I'm not going to ask Sam Altman what a short story means. Right. Well, he would just ask ChatGPT.
Nilay Patel 13:54 ↗
That's right.
Hi everyone. This segment of Decoder Sessions features Helen Havoc, the publisher of The Verge, and Christy Argelon, Uber's global head of advertising. I think you're going to enjoy this conversation.
Christy, just to start, when did Uber launch advertising, and how is it going?
Christy Argelon 14:10 ↗
It's been a really interesting journey for Uber. Most people came to know Uber as the alternative to a ride-hailing service, but the other side of the platform is Uber Eats. And the Uber Eats side was where we first got into advertising was simple sponsored listings so that any restaurant on our platform could actually run ads. We started to realize we have this platform that is full of people going places and getting things. And there's no better way to show brand relevancy than to insert your brand into decision-making in the moment that it's happening and to help facilitate and provide offers, information, services at the moment people are making decisions.
Nilay Patel 14:57 ↗
What makes Uber advertising unique as a product?
Christy Argelon 15:00 ↗
Well, one of the things that we keep seeing in our research with consumers is that there is this enormous trend to use digital as quickly as possible to make decisions so that they can get back into the physical world. And we see that over and over again on the Uber platform. People are looking to quickly find a ride to get to a bar where they can meet friends and watch their favorite football team together. And so this pivot from the digital world enhancing what people really want to do in the physical world is a role that Uber plays that's incredibly powerful.
Nilay Patel 15:41 ↗
There's something very interesting about this cast of characters, particularly Peter Thiel who comes up in your book, Elon Musk who comes up in your book somewhere over a hundred times I think. They are falling back to literally Catholicism as some kind of moral foundation for whatever decisions they're making. And whether or not they're misreading Catholicism is irrelevant to them. Like they're often in fights with the pope.
Jill Lepore 16:06 ↗
Yeah.
Nilay Patel 16:06 ↗
Which is just not something a straight reading of Catholicism would allow you to do.
Jill Lepore 16:11 ↗
Yeah.
There's a fetishization of, you know, there's an entire culture of thinking. I won't call it a philosophy because I don't think it's quite that developed, but a culture of thinking around first principles, right? We're going to do first principles thinking and that will lead us to some disruptive outcome.
Nilay Patel 16:26 ↗
And it often to me at least feels like where that first principle begins is a choice about what to ignore from the past. And I see that kind of over again in your book, in the culture that we live in at large, that deciding what to set aside is the big decision, right? And that's an assumption that is often not questioned as we go step by step towards a more quantified society, step by step towards a more automated society. That there's something messy about democracy that is very, very important. And the decision we're making now is to actually set that mess aside in the name of, I don't know, efficiency, potentially happiness. I'm curious if you see that kind of setting aside is happening by accident or on purpose.
Jill Lepore 17:14 ↗
I mean, I think of these guys as really instrumental. They're not pursuing knowledge for its own sake. They are deeply interested in exploration and I think and wonder. And I think like one of the things I really love about this moment is the fascination with space and, you know, space exploration I think is tremendously exciting. You know, harnessed to militarization in certain commercial projects is like wow we went from Star Trek to Star Wars really fast. You know, like the sense that what you might want to know about the world can be just because it's worth knowing rather than that you can use it to extract money from other people. That's, I just don't think that's part of that tech culture. It's just not that position, right? A kind of humanist commitment to knowledge for the sake of the accumulation of wisdom and leading a better life and understanding the world with greater clarity and greater compassion. I think it's largely mocked in that world as woke or feminine or lib turn whatever. Like I think especially with the kind of the conservative turn of the tech world it takes on weird veances. Yeah, I think it is really purposeful. Like this kind of knowledge is not worth having. We can't make money off of it. We can't, you know, if we had that kind of knowledge it might slow down what we're trying to do. And what we're trying to do is win the AI race and determine the future of humanity and, you know, like the lack of curiousness about the bigger world in the place of these really thrilling inventions within it. I don't know, I find it bizarre. I mean, and all this causes a lot of self-reflection on my part. Like a lot of these people are my former students, right? Like we, I teach at Harvard. We send so many students off to work in Silicon Valley and then they just talk this way and like what happened? What did we do wrong? Like what was there? Do you not have a sense of obligation to the human condition?
Nilay Patel 19:33 ↗
You have a number of these markers. Walk us through some of them from the internet and social platforms will cause an outbreak of democracy to where we are now in 2026.
Jill Lepore 19:43 ↗
That first begins to emerge in the 1980s. It's like if you go back to 1984 and the launch of the Apple Macintosh and that, you know, famous iconic Apple TV ad from the Super Bowl in January of 1984 with it's like an outtake from it looks like you're watching George Orwell's 1984 with these kind of like people dressed in gray and they're all skins all gray and they march into a room and, you know, whatever the Olympian woman comes through and smashes Big Brother on the screen and the tagline of the ad is 1984 will not be like 1984. The promise that that was attempting to illustrate was that the personal computer would be revolutionary. As I'm sure you've talked about in your show and, you know, and your audience really understands that the celebration of the personal computer as emancipating came out of the counterculture. There's this great book From Counterculture to Cyberculture that's about the so-called California ideology that marries kind of counterculture libertarianism to computer utopianism. And you see that realized in 1984 with the launch of the Macintosh like oh well we're going to defeat totalitarianism in the form of like the giant mainframe IBM that's run by, you know, that's associated with two things at the time. Businesses, big businesses, which are the only places they can afford these giant IBM mainframes that are running payroll systems and stuff for big corporations. And the Republican party, which actually has a ton of IBM mainframes, and the Democrats have basically no computers. It's a huge problem for the Democrats in the 1970s and 1980s. So, there's this whole like the personal computer is going to advance liberty, personal freedom, and therefore democracy. It's not, it's like a kind of libertarian version. But it's about emancipation and, you know, it's an ad campaign. It's like at the end of the day, it's just an ad campaign. Yeah. And there are people who are like, well, exactly how does the personal computer, like it's great. I would like one. It's fun to have. Like it's like I also like a nice toaster, but like my toaster isn't going to emancipate me. Like what is it about? But so you begin to see new tech computing products as very carefully packaged with an ideal about personal liberation. And then so by the time you get to the 90s in the, you know, the opening of the internet to commercial traffic that you see the scaling of that promise, right? Like, well, what's going to happen is now we all going to have personal computers are going to be linked to one another and so society is going to become emancipated and democratized, right? That we're going to have a digital democracy. Even though like it's a little bit like, you know, when political pundits like make election forecasts and they're wrong half the time but no one ever remembers even what they forecast and it's like how do you even have a job? Like the people in the 80s that said the personal computer was going to liberate people. Well, it didn't, right? But then in the 90s it's like no but the internet is going to democratize societies. Well, they didn't. That was just an ad campaign. And not that there weren't like plenty of people that sincerely believed that or there certainly is tremendous democratizing potential for the internet, right? Like there was a lot of promise there, but it's not realized for all kinds of reasons. And then so it's like already two strikes, but then you get to like 2004 and all the social media is like, oh Facebook like we're going to democratize this. We're going to connect everybody. We're going to have a fully, you know, everyone will be able to be close to one another. And then that also doesn't happen. And then what we need is democratic AI. And that doesn't mean we have a say in democracy, in we as a polity have a say. It just means that like democratic countries should lift all restrictions and regulations on so that democracies can have AI before authoritarianism. Like it's just an old story.
Nilay Patel 23:48 ↗
Can I push back on this a little bit because I personally struggle with that ad campaign, but the reality of it? There's not a world previous to the internet where a guy like me who grew up in Wisconsin with no connections to the media ends up interviewing you, a Harvard professor. Like, the internet needed to arrive. Publishing needed to be democratized. For whatever reason, AOL needed to pay a bunch of bloggers $12 a blog post and then somehow decide that I should be one of those people. Like, a lot of things had to happen where gatekeepers did fall away. And people like me were allowed to go find their audience. And I see it every single day now with young people who style themselves as creators or YouTubers that they know that they can go start a business and go reach people on these platforms in some way. The flip side of that is I do think a bunch of gatekeepers, the men who own these platforms, largely men, realized they could turn the knobs, right? That Elon Musk could buy X and he could take X from a platform where when it was known as Twitter, lots and lots of activists could find each other and shape public opinion and now X is whatever X is and mostly like racist find me, right? Like that's my experience of that platform whenever I participate. Mark Zuckerberg, you know, he started a Supreme Court for Facebook moderation because he wanted to recapitulate the minations of democracy for people who had been banned for being crazy in their local Facebook groups. Maybe that worked and maybe it didn't. My friend Casey Newton's going to have something to write about in Platformer for the rest of his life as that experiment continues. But Zuckerberg was like, this is kind of dumb. I'm turning it off. We're doing community notes here. No more moderation. There's some kind of pendulum swing. I agree with you. This is largely an ad campaign, but a lot of people were able to find each other. A lot of new people were allowed to gain a much larger platform with which to affect the culture, if not society at large. How do you put that in the context of the artificial state? I'm going to, I'll just preview. My next question is going to be about targeted advertising, which I think is an enormously influential piece of the puzzle. But it's that dynamic that I struggle with, right? It's not purely an ad campaign.
Jill Lepore 26:02 ↗
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No, I think that's fair. I think we tend to forget that for instance up until fairly recent history maybe the 1980s very few newspaper reporters in the United States had college degrees. They were people, you know, mostly men but there were a lot of women beat reporters and women editorial writers who started out like delivering newspapers, you know, working at the press, the printing, working the printing presses at newspapers, climbed their way up. I mean, you know, there's a reason Jimmy Olsen is in the newsroom with Clark Kent in the 1930s comic books. Like, these are just, they're like street kids and they know the streets and they start reporting. I don't think they're that different from, you know, coming up with a $12 blog post payment, right? That what happens in every industry, unsurprisingly, right? Like there's a new medium emerges, the daily paper or the twice daily paper, right? Creates all kinds of opportunities for new, like the interview is invented, you know, eyewitness reporting is invented, the byline is invented. Like the history of the newspaper is kind of all about like an explosion of new kinds of doors that different people can walk through to report on the world to other people and then more people can learn about the world because these newspapers are different. Like there's an explosion in the democratization of any new technology of communication when it starts. Like by definition, right? If you can make a technology of communication cheaper and faster, you're going to reach more people and more people are going to be involved in producing it. That happens with the, you know, with the first weekly newspapers, with the penny press in the 1830s, with the telegraph in the 1840s. It happens, you know, with how the telephone changes news reporting, the wire service in the Mexican-American War. It happens with the radio in the 1920s. It happens with TV in the 1950s. But in each of those, in fact, what's kind of interesting about that, each of those transformations reshapes the party system. There have been seven party systems in American history and they all turn on a new emerging communications technology, which unsettles the relationship between the elites and the people, right? Like the people get more power, the parties just...
have to get realigned. But what always happens is the elites regain the power, right? Like they don't like it, right? They don't like the newsboys becoming beat reporters becoming editors. They're like, who are these nouveau people? To use your metaphor, they turn the dial, they regain control, they consolidate their power over the medium, and then it kind of has to wait for the next communications technology revolution. I think the tricky thing about the moment that we're in now is the emerging technologies are not restoring power to the people. They're not turning the wheel this way; we're just keeping going this way. I teach undergraduates, like I see them go out in the world. There are no jobs for them. You want to be a writer, you want to be an artist, you want to be a movie maker, you want to be a screenwriter. Where are you going to get a job? The whole culture industry is imploding. So I don't think this is like a magnificent time to be out there being an influencer. Like we still don't have health insurance. I mean, we still can't buy a house. Like I just don't think we're in a moment of emancipation that's responding to that consolidation. Some people like it's great, like these billionaires have all this power over our culture. I don't. But like we're continuing to rotate in their direction. I don't think it's kind of turning back. So I guess that's how I would grant for you that there is always something thrilling, emancipatory, illuminating, increasingly inclusive about a new communications technology. So I wouldn't deny that. And so you're right to that degree. It's not just an ad campaign. But I do think we're in a kind of exceptional moment right now.
Nilay Patel 30:13 ↗
I said I was going to ask about targeted advertising. And one of the reasons I think the pendulum has swung back so sharply is a reaction to what you might call identity politics. In the book you say that identity politics as we know it is made possible by computer-run sorting and targeting, right? That the algorithms on these platforms will put us all together and then we will say, here's an identity, we're a block, we have some political power as a block, deal with us. That seems true. I think we've all had that experience. We've seen that play out both in the culture and in our politics more broadly. But you can push back on that, right? You can say, no, we don't like that. Identity politics bad, right? That's too woke. And you can see the culture react to that. You can see certainly politicians and billionaires react to that. But I don't think identity politics is only a product of quantifiability, right, of computerated targeting and sorting. It certainly existed before. Do you think the identity politics of today is defined by the fact that we all exist on platforms, or do you think it's just shaped by it? What's the relationship there?
Jill Lepore 31:15 ↗
I remember being quite struck reading an article from 1968 in a magazine that I think was called like Science and Technology, like a popular magazine, like the Wired of the 1960s, by this guy Dolapool who was an MIT political scientist. In 1968, he was asked with J.C.R. Licklider, the inventor of the internet, to speculate on what the computer revolution would mean by the year 2000. And they were both really smart guys and they had really, really fascinating things to say. And the old dissol, this political scientist said certainly by then there will be personal newspapers, like you will log onto your computer in the morning and it will be worked because the computer was moving in 1968 from being a storage and data processing device to being a communications device, being both of those things. And Paul said, you know, there really won't be able to be party politics if you have your own newspaper because a party, a political party is the organization of political dissent, of shared political priorities. And you know, I don't think we'll even have interest group politics, you know, like the Black Congressional Caucus is an interest group, right? Or corn growers, corn farmers association is an interest group. He's like, I don't think we'll even have that. We'll really only be able to have kind of personal politics. Like we will, I just think that our notion of a representative government where we agree to elect people to represent not, you know, my individual interests but like the interests of my community. We won't be able to do that because no one will have a sense of what is in the interest of my community. You'll only have the sense of your own interest and that's kind of not how a representative democracy works. Like our system of government will be incompatible with our technology of communication. Smart people saw this, you know, 50, 60 years ago. And I think smart people see it now happening all the time. And it's something that is complicated for political campaigns to work with. And of course, the way they can work with, the only way they can work with it is to use the best tools that are available to them to win elections. Like you read interviews now with campaign consultants who are like, I really do not want to use these tools. I really do not want to do microtargeted messaging voter by voter with deep fake AI ads to convince people to vote for my candidate. I really believe in my candidate but I don't want to use these tools but I have to use these tools because there's no moratorium on using these tools and therefore I have to use the tools that I think my enemy will also be. Like it's just kind of a sad moment. I don't think there's anybody, I don't know, there's probably like some wretched human beings out there really excited to do deep fakes and you know win elections that way. But I think like most people in politics are not loving this moment.

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APA

Lepore, J. (2026, July 20). Dr. Jill Lepore on why AI backlash is vital | Decoder [Interview transcript]. Decoder with Nilay Patel. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3005039/

MLA

Jill Lepore. "Dr. Jill Lepore on why AI backlash is vital | Decoder." Decoder with Nilay Patel, 20 Jul. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3005039/.

BibTeX
@misc{lepore2026_3005039,
  author       = {Jill Lepore},
  title        = {Dr. Jill Lepore on why AI backlash is vital | Decoder},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Decoder with Nilay Patel. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {jul},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3005039/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}