And we are very fortunate to be live with Jill Lepore, Harvard historian, staff writer at The New Yorker, and this year the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of a new book, We the People, about the Constitution and the challenge of amending it. Jill, thanks so much for being with us.
Yeah, thanks for having me.
Let me ask you — so we're celebrating the 250th anniversary of this constitutional republic, or at least beginning with the Declaration of Independence. When you think about the crisis that we're in now, and I think it's fair to call it a crisis, what is unique about this moment in the context of what's come before?
I mean, one of the things I like to remember about the 250th, although we are celebrating the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, is that that followed months of constitutional drafting and the establishment of constitutionalism — written constitutionalism — in the United States. So, you know, after the war began, the colonial governments all collapsed and the former colonies, now states, had to draft constitutions, and they began doing so in January 1776. And we sort of, kind of, this whole year of marking the 250th haven't really talked about that.
One of the reasons we're celebrating — I enjoyed in your book is the discussion of the state constitution, which I personally never paid attention to.
Don't we? I think, you know, actually I think a lot of Americans don't even realize they have state constitutions. Nor do they know that the federal constitution can be amended. So in a way it's been a weird 250th anniversary because most of the public discussion has been about, I don't know, you know, the Trump arch or the Smithsonian bullying or the mixed martial arts fighting on White House lawn. Not that those aren't news stories, but they're not of anything like the scale and significance of thinking about the emergence of modern constitutionalism, the emergence of the modern democratic liberal state.
I think that it's a moment to reflect on the fragility of that invention and its very particular and peculiar historical origins in the age of print, and in an age of a very different set of ideas about humans and their place in the world. So, I mean, I think what's just, you know, distinctive about this moment in time in the history of the American Republic — I mean, there have been more fragile moments. The Civil War would count, I think. The scale of suffering in the Great Depression would count. The threat to democracies around the world during the Second World War count as graver concerns than this moment.
But there's something about this era of crisis that feels like it really doesn't involve an external threat. Like these are problems of our own making. This is an own goal, own goal as the kids say, that we are watching much of our civil society unravel and we ourselves are doing it. There's no, you know, communist subversion even to potentially blame. I think that's striking. I mean, even in the Civil War there was an us and a them, whichever kind of American you were. I think that was, you know, understood as in a way an external threat even though, you know, we were kind of by definition — that's what a civil war is. There's something to me that feels — I don't know, maybe this is paradoxical — both needless and inevitable about this moment.
Well, the thing that strikes me in reading history and thinking about this moment is the continuation of themes that have been eternal in the history of our country: race, supremacy of religion and Christianity as a religion, controversies over immigration. It tracks geographically. You know, what was the Confederacy is now the kind of most intense part of the Republican Party base. It's the region that has the less education — and we have a division along educational lines — has the most fraught history racially with respect to slavery. It's the place where evangelism is most prominent in the United States.
And it does seem to me that there are two overlays to that that make it more intense, that internal strife that you're talking about. One is that all of those divisions around those issues are now congruent with political parties. They're not mixed. The parties are not heterogeneous as they were for a very long time after the Civil War. And the other is that we are in fact not long from becoming a majority-minority country, which I think for people who have been most threatened by social changes, by the civil rights revolution, the sexual revolution, the rising role of women in our economy and society, the rising importance of education — those people are now seeing or fearing that they're losing primacy in the society, and that for some reason strikes me as what is different right now. What do you think about that?
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Yeah, I don't know. I mean, I went on a kind of long little research jag trying to understand the consequences of the familiarity that Americans have kind of in their mind's eye with the electoral map, and when that really started. And I think it exaggerates our political divisions, right? So if you're now picturing, you know, the 2016 electoral map, or we could look at the 2008, you know, when we are at a point where we're reliably using red to indicate the Republican Party and blue to indicate the Democratic Party, and you have the, you know, the blue Northeast and mostly blue Midwest and blue California and everything else is red.
That is a misrepresentation of the nation's political affiliations, and it's an artifact of the Electoral College, right? Just because we vote by state doesn't mean that states are — and that, you know, we're talking in Massachusetts. I grew up in a devoutly Republican family. We had a Republican governor for most of the time I was growing up in this state. I think of Massachusetts as quite heavily Republican. It's not Trumpy Republican, but if you present election results by district visually, it's a very different look, right? So I think that we have — and honestly, like, a lot of that is an artifact of television. And television news coverage, especially election night news coverage, you know, obsession with the electoral map.
So first of all, the red and the blue is not stable, right? If you look at earlier versions of maps, the party color matching is inverted.
You know, it's obviously arbitrary, but in the first time that television returns were being broadcast, I think it was in 1952, it's black and white. And so they have like zebra stripes and solid, which is actually really interesting. But it actually, you know, the more intensely television news is covering presidential elections happens to coincide with rising polarization. And there are so many factors behind rising polarization.
But I think there's a kind of reification of the idea of the sort of politics of partisan identity as being defined. And, you know, that's bad for a polity, right? It's not that partisan loyalty is itself a bad thing, but every electorate needs moderates, needs those swing voters who don't identify one way or the other. And that becomes a smaller portion of the electorate in that environment.
So, in any event, what I was also trying to say is that it is striking — like just this weekend, a class I'm teaching, we were looking at the electoral map from 1896. And the Democratic and Republican Party are reversed, right? The Republicans win New England, the Midwest, and California because it's really the Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln, right? Ending slavery. It's the party of reform. It is beginning to become the party of business. And the Democrats win the former Confederacy because they're the conservative southern white Democrats.
So, one thing that I think is useful about studying history is to recognize that even what the parties do and are is by no means predetermined. It's actually really changeable. Partisan realignment is something to really think about and pay attention to because I think it gives you a sense of the possibility of change. I honestly think, like, just in terms of teaching young people, I think they're just very easy to think like it has ever been thus, it will always be thus. Like people can't talk to one another. This is a red state, that's a blue — like as if these things are just kind of defined as the law of nature or something.
So, what I'm kind of enjoying about this election is the sort of possibility of a shake-up. It's just, I think for young people in particular, whatever your political preferences are about the outcome of the election, it's just fun when things kind of get mixed up again.
Yeah. When you think about the drafting of the Constitution, which of course you had studied so closely, you know, the founders wanted not to have monarchical power. They didn't want an executive who's too strong. They had checks and balances. They also didn't anticipate or desire the creation of political parties. And I wonder if you think it's fair to say that what we're seeing right now is the worst of what they feared — that is, a president who is trying to assert power in a way that corrupts the balance that was created by the Constitution, and a political party that is submitting to him and therefore preventing the legislature from being a check and balance, not to mention the Supreme Court.
Yeah. I mean, what's tricky about that kind of a question for me as a historian is I don't want to suggest I don't care what the framers thought, but I actually don't defer to that. Like, I think we could say there has been an abuse of executive power. Congress, which is meant to be the most powerful branch, is now the least powerful. We have a kind of judicial supremacy that was unanticipated within the terms of our — like, we can say all of those things without needing to bow before the altar of James Madison. And I mean, as a historian, like, I love James Madison. Like, I can read the Federalist Papers all day, but like, I actually think the cultural impulse to, you know, what would the founders do? What would they think of us now?
They had no expectation that we would think of them.
They did not write a constitution that they thought would require constantly asking ourselves, you know, would James Madison approve of AK-47s within 10 yards of an elementary school? Like...
Consistent with the theme of your book, which is that everything dies and needs to be refreshed and regenerated.
Yeah. And that they founded our system of constitutionalism and what I call a philosophy of amendment on the idea that everything that is written down has to be subject to amendment, to editing, to fixing things that were done badly, that have ceased to work well, to repairing something that did damage, to improving something that could withstand improvement, to altering something to respond to changing conditions. I mean, they were philosophers. They were political philosophers. Like, they were deep thinkers who had studied antiquity, they had studied history, they studied what Alexander Hamilton called the new science of politics. They were trying to devise something new under the sun, which was a written constitution.
You know, England didn't have a written constitution. They wanted something that could be written down, that would be transparent, open, inspectable by the people, had to be ratified by the people, and could be amended by them, so that the sovereignty of the people would remain intact, and that the contingency of establishing a government would be acknowledged by all, and it would remain in the power of the people to alter or abolish any frame of government that they erected. So, then to use the system that they established in a way that implies we must forever ask their permission...
I don't understand it. You know, that this is just the thing like — I also, I don't even know if I wrote about this in the book, but there's a whole kind of interesting history to when it began that people would ask, 'What would the founders do?'
And it follows the rise of religious fundamentalism, the emergence of religious fundamentalism in the 1880s and 1890s. And this book that is published by a fundamentalist called What Would Jesus Do? And then, you know, constitutional conservatism is born soon after that, and borrows a lot of its structure from religious fundamentalism. And so the question then, you know, what would the founders do? And it was a way for constitutional conservatives to oppose progressive era labor legislation, really. To say George Washington would not, you know, like the idea that there's workers' comp, right?
I remember during the Obama administration, I went to a Tea Party rally and the whole theme of everybody I spoke to was, you know, Benjamin Franklin would not want there to be government-subsidized medical insurance. And I was like, 'Why is that a thing? Like, in what universe does that make any sense to consult — like Benjamin, I adore him. I'm not going to ask his permission about whether we need the Affordable Care Act.'
Let me ask you on the practical dimension of what we're talking about. Your book explores the disuse of Article 5 of the Constitution, the long track of American history where it is not used. A couple years ago, I remember interviewing Joe Biden at the White House about the threat to democracy. And at that time, many people were saying on the Democratic side that we needed to overcome what you refer to at one point in the book as the tyranny of the minority and change things like the Senate filibuster, which is preventing action, the structure of the Electoral College, which gives disproportionate power to states with small numbers of people, some form of reform for the Supreme Court, which is sort of dug in against trying to reverse some social progress.
Nobody even talked at that time about amending the Constitution because it was understood, I think, to be so impossible to do. You know, you mention in your book that it's typically taken a war to wake up Article 5. Do you think that's still true?
I don't really think that's true because one of the things that's different about our wars, the wars in the era of the global war on terrorism, is that they date to an era where we have an all-volunteer military. So, the reason that a war can be a trigger that allows for political dissent to find expression in constitutional reform is the shared burden of fighting the war. And Americans don't share that burden. And in particular, members of Congress don't share that burden. I mean, it used to be, you know, for every war of the 20th century, members of Congress had sons and in some cases daughters who were fighting in those wars. That's just statistically not true anymore.
The universality of the World War II experience was a huge factor, I think, in the post-World War II polity.
Yeah, it's really affected our foreign policy, obviously, as well. So, yeah, I don't know what will trigger it. I mean, this has been a drought. The US Constitution has not been meaningfully amended since 1971, but it's not even the longest drought. And in a way, though, what happens is the Constitution appears unamendable to everyone until suddenly, you know, what George Washington called the constitutional door is kind of shoved open by the masses. So, the 15th Amendment is ratified in 1870. The 16th Amendment isn't ratified until 1913. That's a pretty long dry spell, too. But then, progressives managed to get four amendments ratified between 1913 and 1920. And then the door slammed shut again.
Do you feel like we're close at this point to somebody shoving open the door? Or not?