Good evening. I'm David Nirenberg, the director of the and Leon Levy Professor here at the Institute for Advanced Study, and it's my great joy to welcome you to this installment of the Director's Conversations on the place and practice of the arts and sciences in the past, present, and future of humanity.
[sighs] My work here is done. So far in this series, we've discussed biography, universities, opera, museums, foundations, dance, philosophy, machine learning, architecture, and then universities again. Probably not for the last time.
In those conversations, we focused on how important forms of human discovery emerge, persist, and change, in part to better understand the Institute's own distinctive form of inquiry and what these can offer the future, what we, the Institute, can offer the future. So how forms of human discovery emerge, persist, and change? That question has felt increasingly urgent over the five years that we've been holding these conversations. It's also the very question that the Institute was founded to address.
Consider this letter written to Supreme Court Justice Lewis Brandeis by Abraham Flexner, the Institute's founder, in 1932 in the midst of the Great Depression, when the Institute had not yet hired a single scholar. I'll read it because it's very small print, but I wanted you to see the original, especially the temporary address up there at the top.
Dear Justice Brandeis, I hope I shall not be subject to arrest or impeachment if I venture on the basis of your dissenting opinion on the Oklahoma case to you on having once more pointed out the great advantage which the American federal system gives to the United States, namely elasticity, freedom of experiment, etc. The problems with which we are dealing in education and economics are insoluble on a countrywide basis. They are soluble only if experimental stations can be set up here and there at the risk of those who have the intelligence and the courage to make an experiment.
So Brandeis has a little constitutional, a little legal history. Jill, forgive me if I get this make a hash of this, but his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Company versus Liebman had defended a state's right to regulate economic competition, arguing that, and I quote from the minority, a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Flexner extended the argument to the American university system and his experiment, he wrote to Brandeis, his single courageous state, we might say, was the institute. So I quote more from this letter. In this proposed Institute for Advanced Study, I shall smash all precedents freely and nobody will stop me. You can see why he only lasted one term. We shall learn something from our successes and perhaps not less from our failures. If American universities are to be improved, they can only be improved on the basis of experimentation set up independently of existing institutions.
So I don't know if Brandeis was a reader of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, but Flexner certainly was. In his 1874 On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, which is often translated as On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, Nietzsche had emphasized the importance of plastische Kraft, plasticity, a capacity for change without which, he said, the past would become the gravedigger of the present, making individuals and societies incapable of evolution.
Where Brandeis points to states as a source of plasticity for the Constitution and the nation, Flexner presents his nascent institute as a space of experimentation in the built environment of research designed to encourage the evolution of universities, corporate research centers. He said the institute is a wedge between universities and corporate research centers and other institutional forms for intellectual life.
So today, we find ourselves standing at the 250th birthday of these United States and in 2037-38 that of the Constitution, not to mention the most important of these dates, the institute's own centennial in 2030, rotund anniversaries that attest to the historical endurance of certain political, cultural, and institutional forms. But these years also mark a period of rapid technological, political, and sociocultural change that is straining some of our most basic ideas, including ideas about institutions, about the state, and even about the distinctiveness of human intelligence and the future of the human.
The institute has a long history of thinking about history, a focus of attention since our founding and flourishing today in the School of Historical Studies and also in other schools, statistics, social science, and even mathematics. And also it has a history of both contributing to and worrying about technological change. Think Oppenheimer or von Neumann, who himself coined the today terrifying term the singularity to describe that point at which technological progress becomes so complex that human life and history are fundamentally and irrevocably altered.
So it seemed appropriate on this semi-quincentennial of the United States and amidst deep anxiety about the place of nature and humanity in the emerging future, to seek counsel from Jill Lepore, who has emerged not only as one of the most eloquent historians of these United States. And in fact, she comes to us from receiving the Pulitzer Prize yesterday in New York for her We the People, a history of the US Constitution, but also as a prominent and powerful critic of how technological change is transforming the possibilities of politics and of life, both for humans, Aristotle's zoon politikon, political animal, and for non-human life as well, on which see her latest book, The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State, both for sale outside from our neighbor Labyrinth Books.
As is our custom, we've attempted to adumbrate her accomplishments in the program on your seats rather than recite them all in this introduction. And that's especially important today, this custom, because Jill Lepore is among the most prolific as well as the most eloquent of the scholars of our age. And I should stress all without the assistance of AI. And her accomplishments are many. Suffice it to say here that she is a staff writer for the New Yorker, a professor of law and history at Harvard University, a writer of astoundingly exquisite and deeply thought-provoking prose, and also a farmer of sheep.
Today we will talk about the Constitution, about the capacity for change, about technology, about the force of history, and I'm sure about much else beside. Please welcome Jill Lepore to the stage.
It seems to me that historians are also prophets to some degree in that...
But here's how. In that what they're interested in is often animated or informed by their experience of the present or their fears for the future. And I think that was certainly true of the first historian of constitutions I know, Aristotle, who wrote his history of the Constitution of Athens at the same time that that was becoming a useless piece of paper thanks to Alexander the Great.
You have just written a history of the Constitution. Why? What fears, what concerns about the present animate that attention?
Yeah, I think it's inescapable that historians who undertake a work like this are very much answering concerns from the present day. Although it's part of a... I don't know about you, David, but it seems to me part of our fealty to the guild that we're supposed to deny that that is the case. We're supposed to pretend that we're not concerned about the present.
My favorite example of this is the great Columbia University historian Charles Beard in 1913 published this just barnstorming book called An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States in which he said the framers of the Constitution drafted in Philadelphia in 1787 were animated by concern for their own private wealth. His account of the Constitution was essentially a critique of the plutocrats of the Gilded Age and of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to revise the Constitution, to amend the Constitution. This really conservative Supreme Court of his day had struck down all manner of progressive labor reforms in the states and federal laws as well. And he wrote his account of the Constitution to critique a conservative interpretation of it and then resoundingly denied that he had any concern whatsoever about what was going on in the country in 1913.
So all of which is to say, sure, I absolutely had a concern about the health of our constitutional democracy in undertaking to write this book and in particular, I really wanted to ask readers to think about why it is that our Constitution is so difficult to amend by way of the mechanism that exists in the Constitution, which is Article V, in which the people amend the Constitution.
I think most Americans don't know that the Constitution can be amended. They think of constitutional changes taking place in the hands of the Supreme Court. And whether they like that or don't like that, I think a lot of Americans just don't even know that there are other ways. And also I just genuinely was curious about how it is that our Constitution has come to endure such long periods of amendment drought. Why is it so difficult to amend the US Constitution? Why are we in such a long period of amendment drought? The last time the US Constitution was meaningfully amended was 1971. And what are the consequences for that?
Yeah, I also think that we have partly because we are so focused on the Supreme Court in our understanding of the Constitution. And this a little bit comes out of having moved to teaching in the law school. Or the law school faculty think the Constitution is only what the Supreme Court says it is. And that's just not how historians think about the Constitution or constitutionalism. So I wanted to write an account that sort of unlock the Constitution from the prison of a kind of judicial interpretation exclusively.
I'm going to stick with Aristotle for a minute because you know one of the things he said was that it's very important that a Constitution be changeable because no Constitution can foresee the future. But it's also important that it not be too changeable, lest in its malleability it not seem sacred, lest it lose its gravitas. This was something that the framers of the US Constitution were also very concerned with.
Absolutely. I mean they have this sort of Goldilocks problem to solve in the drafting of the Constitution. And the way in which they thought about the problem because they were sort of specific where they're writing down a Constitution, but they were doing that in the aftermath of the states writing down constitutions. I think we tend to forget that like this 250th anniversary, sure, we're marking the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence from July of 1776, but before that, states had begun writing their constitutions. New Hampshire starting in January of 1776. So really, this is the 250th anniversary of written constitutionalism in the United States and then where after it flowered around the world.
So they had a sort of specific problem. They wanted to write down a Constitution so that it was transparent and accountable, they could be ratified by the people, right? They were dealing, they'd come out of a struggle with Parliament over whether parliamentary taxation of the colonies was constitutional or not, but they couldn't point anything in the English Constitution that said it wasn't because the English Constitution is unwritten. So they really committed to writing it down, but when you write something down, you risk its meaning becoming fixed. And they really opposed to even the document having a fixed meaning, but they also didn't want to disenfranchise subsequent generations. Right? They didn't want to shackle their descendants to the dead hand of the past as Jefferson would have put it.
Right. Or, you know, Madison talked about the danger of the Constitution getting old. No one thought it was going to get old. People thought it was going to just have to be replaced pretty soon. It was just a kind of working attempt to frame a federal government, but that if it got old, Madison said it would suffer from the inevitable danger of all things that get old, that we would blindly venerate them.
So having an amendment provision, which is something that state constitutions had invented, in particular Massachusetts had invented, was a way, was a check against that brittleness. That future generations of Americans would, sure, they'd be able to inspect the Constitution, be publicly available. They could look at it. They could know if something was unconstitutional. But they couldn't mend and repair or correct and improve or update that Constitution as time and circumstances allowed.
So they thought about it a lot, but in the way that Brandeis talked about the states as laboratories of democracy is something that Brandeis talked about a lot even before he joined the court. This is how the framers thought about the state constitutions. They had been laboratories of constitutionalism. And they felt that states that had amendment provisions had better constitutions. But some of them were too easy to amend and some were too hard. So they were trying to figure out a way to make this Constitution just right.
In a way I think you would say that the Constitution was necessary precisely because it could be amended, that the Articles of Confederation had proven like they had to be unanimous and Rhode Island always said no.
Rhode Island, right. Rhode Island was known as Rogue Island at the time, which I think we should bring back. [laughter] I really, I love their self-custom down there. Rhode Island kept vetoing. It had to have a unanimous approval of all 13 states to ratify, to amend, even to ratify the Articles of Confederation, which took seven years to ratify. And then they were already obsolete by the time they were done. Right.
So one of the things that constitutional scholars would say is that an amendment provision is essential to the legitimacy of a Constitution. Not just the provision, but the ability to exercise it. If it's a dead letter, what's the purpose of having an amendment? Right? That for a Constitution to have democratic legitimacy, people must know that they can amend it if it is necessary. So there is a kind of crisis every time our Constitution goes through one of these very long periods of unamendability. It results in a crisis of constitutional legitimacy.
But in a way nothing changed because Rhode Island was like 2% of the population of the colonies and it had this like absolute... And I think when Scalia was...
He did the math and he said 2% of the population of this country, now we're talking in the 20th century, can block an Article V amendment. So in a sense like nothing changed. What happened?
Well, yeah, so the math that the framers did didn't work.
They needed the Institute for Advanced Study.
Needed some few Fields Medalists to help them out. So it was largely James Madison, but it also was a little bit arbitrary, honestly. So it's a double super, an amendment that gets to Congress has to pass a two-thirds supermajority in both houses and then it has to be ratified by three-quarters of the states either in convention or in state legislatures.
And there are other ways to amend the code. You can call a constitutional convention, but there have been 12,000 amendments proposed on the floor of Congress and we've only ever ratified 27 of them. Whereas in the states, our state constitutions are also all amendable. There have been about 12,000 amendments to state constitutions since 1789 of which about 8,000 have been ratified, which is quite a common amendment rate around the world for written constitutions.
Nation states amend their constitutions all the time, which is not necessarily the best thing either. There's not like frequent amendment where you can have a too-amendable constitution. But so you obvious questions, well why did they set the bar so high or what turned out to be so high? And there are a lot of explanations for that, but the most obvious one is they did not have political parties in 1787, nor did they anticipate there ever would be.
They did not think, you know, in accordance with 18th century Republican political thought, they didn't think a Republic could survive if there were parties. And so they just didn't kind of make allowance for the idea that anyone would sort of choose party over country in considering whether to amend the constitution. And they certainly couldn't have anticipated the kind of polarized politics that we suffer with today.
But it happens so quickly. Like, I'm thinking Jefferson in 1816 says, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, manners and opinions change with change of circumstance, like must be amendable. And then he's already complaining that same year that people are treating the Constitution as the ark of the covenant, that it can't be touched, that it can't be changed. So already by 1816 we're not talking, we're talking 25 years, 28 years after the, it's already seen as something sacred and unamendable.
Then that's partly because other methods of changing the Constitution that are really not constitutional have emerged. So the Supreme Court has, you know, begun to exercise what, you know, judicial review, right? That just the Marshall Court decides we can strike down laws passed by Congress, which is a different way of addressing constitutional change.
And Jefferson himself of course, like when Jefferson wants to buy the Louisiana territory from Napoleon, his advisors is like, dude, you kind of need a constitutional amendment to just do that. Like what in the Constitution says you can double the size of the country? We don't have any money granted from Congress. It's going to be $15 million is what you've sent over to, you know, as an initial proffer. And he's like, what if I just do it? So and that's what happens.
So in other words there's more flexibility in the executive and judicial branches as it turns out. And you know the frame of our government is one in which Congress was meant to be the most powerful branch. And already you see by the 18-teens that that's not always the case, right? There are power grabs by the executive and judicial branches.
In a way I think what you're saying is change happens. If the Constitution is amendable or practically amendable, the water pressure has to go somewhere and it goes to the Supreme Court. How did that happen? Already the Marshall, that's a beginning, but yeah.
Yeah. I mean it's a really good question because again in the states they're just all they're doing is revising their constitution. So the 1820s just state after state after state has a constitutional convention because mostly they have denied voting rights to poor white men and they decide they have to, in the sort of spirit of Jacksonian democracy, they're going to begin granting suffrage to poor white men, especially as more western states enter the Union and they grant suffrage to poor white men.
People like, if I can't vote here I'm going to leave, and so there are constitutional conventions in eastern states to respond. And meanwhile those states are eliminating from their original constitutions the aristocratic elements of their state constitutions. A lot of them had, you know, governors who were elected by the state legislatures rather than directly by the people, something like our electoral college. They had aristocratic provisions in their upper houses the way, you know, at the time and down to 1913 the US Senate was not elected by the people, it was elected by state legislators. So a lot of those things got stripped down in state constitutions.
You know when Tocqueville comes in the 1830s, like this is a crazy place because all they do is change their laws. Just they just keep changing their constitutions. He thought this was exciting and vital and part of the civic capacity of the American people was embodied in their willingness to hold a constitutional convention and just try all over again to see if we could do it better in another laboratory. And so you're like, why does that not happen? And I mean I think that I don't even really explore this in the book so I don't have a good empirical answer for you.
But they're certainly not going to have a constitutional convention because that would open up the question of slavery. So already by the 1820s, right, the sectional divide is extremely profound and you know you have in 1814 New England threatens to secede, the Hartford Convention. By 1832 the South threatens to secede. When John C. Calhoun says, look, we don't have to pay any attention to laws passed by the federal government if we don't like them, if we think they're interfering with slavery.
So there's a real sense that opening up the federal constitution to amendment will lead inevitably to the dissolution of the Union. And so there's a kind of like, let's just let the Supreme Court sort of handle everything constitutional until we can figure this out. And then there is a second constitutional convention that happens in 1861 when the Southern states secede and they hold a constitutional convention and write their own constitution. It's just like ours except it says slavery is constitutional.
And then there's all the amendments after the Civil War.
And then there's essentially the rewriting of the US Constitution after the Civil War.
This conversation is entitled The Force of History, and that's because historians always want to sweep in their own direction. But I mean, Supreme Court justices are not historians, but they very often invoke history, especially in amending the constitution through their own, especially when they're overturning long precedent, for example.
With Igor Levit, we talked about originalism in classical music, and there's also originalism in constitutional law. I wonder, is originalism, would you in your view, a form of historical interpretation? Is it an effort to deploy the force of history?
I really don't think it is. I think it's a mode of judicial interpretation. It disguises itself as historical interpretation. I would say more importantly, originalism is not original. It is to say it's not original to the founding era.
You see plenty of instances, like obviously if I have an old document, you want to know who wrote it, who are they writing it for, what do the words mean, who read it, right? What do the words mean at the time? Like these are questions every historian would ask of every document. And these are questions that originalists ask of the Constitution. So in that sense, right, that's really okay, that's a historical interpretation.
But for a historian, those are maybe the first questions you would ask, but they are not the last. They are the very beginning of an investigation. I sometimes think the difference between an originalist and I don't mean to demean, like in the sense that originalism is quite consistent as a mode of constitutional interpretation, as a judicial philosophy. It has plenty of integrity. So but I'm trying to distinguish here to answer your question, is it history? And I would say it is not.
And it's a little bit like the difference between, I don't know, chemistry and alchemy or astronomy and astrology, right? One is really kind of a superstition-based non-empirical set of commitments. Or it might be like if I said to you, you said you're a chemist and I'm a chemist and I said, well, I'm a chemist, but I'm only really interested in the noble gases and the rest of the periodic table for me just doesn't exist. And you would say to me, how is that chemistry? [laughter] And I would say that that's what originalism feels like to me. In this analogy, I'm the originalist.
Because there's a sort of famous remark that Robert Bork, one of the identifiers, one of the framers of originalism, a term that doesn't emerge until the 1980s. He was asked, you know, if George Washington while at the Constitutional Convention wrote a letter to his wife Martha explaining what he meant by direct taxes, would this matter to you as a piece of evidence relevant to how you would understand direct taxes as a constitutional matter? And he's like, absolutely not. It's totally irrelevant.
And as a historian, I mean, we can disagree about this, but I think no historian would say that is right? The law of evidence is all about rules of exclusion, right? All the things you are not allowed, hearsay, unverified, like there's just a lot of exclusion and that is the kind of the logic of originalism, right? So originalists will only really look at, and this is what I mean by the noble gases. I'm trying to continue this analogy.
Like their noble gases are argon now. [laughter] Their noble gases are, they'll look at the Constitution itself. They'll look at James Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention, which as we know were later revised to suit Madison's own recollections and political purposes very late in his life and were not published until 1840.
They will look at the Federalist Papers, which were published in a New York newspaper and not really widely read or widely available until the 20th century. They'll look at the records of the state ratifying conventions, some of which were not published until the 20th century, but certainly were not available to ordinary people at the time. And then they'll maybe look at Samuel Johnson's 1755 dictionary of the English language. And then that's it. Okay, that's a contained universe of these are the texts that we will consult to understand what the Constitution intended means, how it was understood at the time.
And something even so near to that is a letter written by one of the delegates to his wife is outside the bounds of the rules of evidence. And like that's enough.
You know, like object to great inflation and say like if that was a paper that came onto my desk from a student, no. You can't exclude the entire universe of knowledge that might help you understand this document.
So one of my favorite documents from this period is a letter that Benjamin Franklin's sister Jane wrote to him from Boston right before the Constitutional Convention began. And it's very funny because she was very wry and she's sort of making fun of him, and she's like, I hope all those wise men in Philadelphia remember to beat the swords into plowshares. She has this sort of beautiful invocation of the need for people to learn how to live peaceably with one another.
That matters to how I understand the Constitution. All of the petitions written by people held in slavery seeking their freedom, declaring their natural rights, those matter to how I understand the Constitution. The portraits of the framers and whether they liked being depicted holding paper documents matter to how I think about the Constitution. The architecture of Independence Hall matters to how I think about the Constitution. The people who assembled outside and rallied and screamed and threw stuff at the building matter to how I think about it.
Like this is just a universe of, and it will continue to unravel. We will continually learn more about what people of that time thought of the Constitution. That's even separate from do I think that looking at that evidence is the right way for judges to make decisions. But like I'm just talking about as a historian, my body of evidence is as big as the world.
But the historian's body of evidence has changed over time. In the '50s, historians looked at a much, much, much more restricted body of evidence in all fields of history. In medieval history, they only looked at kings. In American history, they... Yeah. So even professional history has constantly transformed its field.
And I guess what I'm really interested in maybe is a hinge around your word disguise. Because we're talking about the force of history. So I guess my question is why does it seem useful to people trying to change the Constitution through originalism to disguise originalism as history? What's the special force of the historical that makes that a good move?
Yeah. Because I think that there's a great William Brennan quote about this that I'm going to mess up, but it is arrogance cloaked as humility. That's his definition of originalism in 1987 when he finds it abhorrent.
And again, I'm not trying to throw shade on originalism as a motive, but as to answer this question, the idea, and we could have, you can and you should have an originalist on the stage who could defend this better than I. But the idea is judges shouldn't be making decisions based on what's going on in the world today and what their own political preferences are. They need to be humble enough to defer to the original intentions of the framers and the original meaning of the document. And that's the humility, right?
And that is cloaked in the authority of history, right? So that we, it's not me who's deciding that you can have an AR-15 within 10 yards of a kid in kindergarten. It's James Madison. Antonin Scalia would often say that he was handcuffed in the face of the evidence of Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention, which again were not available to anybody before 1840. So it's not an original way that anybody interpreted the Constitution between 1789 and 1840, for instance.
So it also serves certain political ends because by narrowing the historical record to this small set of documents, it erases from our historical past everybody else who ever had a constitutional idea or who was not enfranchised or weakly enfranchised by the constitutional order that is devised in 1787 to 1791.
Even all the people out of doors.
All the people out of doors. So that I mean, if you get to say Brown versus Board of Education in 1954, what happens is the debate is the court asks the people on the other side of the case, did the framers of the 14th Amendment mean by the equal protection of the laws? Is there anything in the historical record that tells us did they mean that segregated schools would violate that amendment? What does the historical record say?
And the NAACP researchers came up with one school of interpretation and the pro-segregationist side came up with another school of interpretation. And the pro-segregationist side really just looked at the deliberations of the 39th Congress whereas the other side can look at all of the writings of every abolitionist beginning with the beginnings of the abolitionist movement and all of the records of what were called in the 19th century the colored conventions.
These were essentially extra constitutional conventions held by black men and some black women in free states starting in 1829. There were more than 200 of these conventions. Black men and women were not able to participate in state constitutional conventions.
They held their own conventions and they deliberated: what do they want a constitution to do? What did the constitution mean to them? What amendments did it require, right? So if you want to understand the history of the 14th Amendment, you actually need it — like, as a historian, you need to look at all of that. If you want to justify a position of exclusion, you can look at a very exclusive past and you'll justify your own position.
But what Earl Warren, who became Chief Justice in the midst of this case, said — he kind of brilliantly looked at the historical record and he says this, this, this, you know, this incredible moment on May 17th, 1954, the room is full of reporters. Everyone knows he's going to issue an opinion from the bench, which really never happens, and he issues this nine-to-zero opinion, which no one expected. And he declares in that room when he's...
When people know exactly what he's going to decide, is when he says it turns out the history in this case is inconclusive. And at that point, reporters race out of the room to get on the phone to call the newsroom. And then you hear on the radio people are declaring they're overturning Plessy v. Ferguson. And there's this tumult in the city of Washington, D.C. as all of the black cab drivers start honking their horns, jumping out of their cars. I mean, it's just this moment, right? Here is this moment when the shackles of history are broken, right? Like if he had deferred to the history as was presented by the segregationists, yes, it's a segregationist country. Yes, it was a segregationist country in 1868 when the 14th Amendment was drafted and ratified. It did not have to be. So just by using this one word that the history is inconclusive, he didn't take the side of the NAACP that its history was better.
It deferred to its social science, right? This was part of what Brandeis's whole work on the court was — saying actually social science research is really important. Like, we actually understand, we need to understand the conditions in which people are living. Those should affect the kinds of decisions we make on the court. That was invented by Brandeis in the Brandeis brief. Like, that was what he did as an attorney. Sorry, I'm getting very excited, but Brandeis, Board of Education gets me very excited. Like, just think about the shattering that that meant to say we are not bound by the dead hand of the past.
And social science research is very important. Both of those things.
It should be well funded and there should be eminent scholars at a beautiful bucolic place in the middle of New Jersey.
That's what they said. Little-known text, footnote of Brown v. Board.
I don't write this stuff. Um, maybe this is the point, the moment to pivot from your 15th book, We the People, to your 16th, The Rise and Fall, if I've got the numbers right, of the Artificial State. Um, it might seem like an enormous pivot from the Constitution to computers, but your first sentence in The Rise and Fall already presents the two as intimately related. And I'm going to read it aloud, although you're a great reader of your own books, but this book is an inquiry into what humans mean and intend in abandoning constitutional democracy, the liberal nation state, and even humanity itself for rule by automation, government by machine, and replacement by artificial intelligence. I guess my...
It's a dark book. People are like...
Kind of. [laughter] Um, what causality do you see between the two halves of that sentence, between automatocracy — did you coin that word?
No, it's a terrible... It's an ugly word, isn't it?
Machine and artificial intelligence on the one hand, and abandoning constitutional democracy on the other.
And you're asserting a causality there.
Yeah. So, um, when I got to the end of We the People, I had to write an epilogue because the book, the narrative ends in 2016 with the death of Antonin Scalia. It's a little bit kind of safely back in the past. Um, but the epilogue, which I think I called The Future of Constitutionalism, is sort of like, can an 18th-century constitution survive in the 21st century? And what would be the challenges, especially an unamendable constitution?
And I talked a little bit about, um, climate catastrophe and artificial intelligence, and that, um, the 18th-century worldview held by the framers of our constitution included a notion of a chain of being in which we have dominion over all the plants and animals, and so there is no accountability for, no sense of limit. Um, our Newtonian constitution predates Darwin, obviously, but it also predates the idea of extinction, um, which Georges Cuvier doesn't, um, develop until the end of the 18th century.
It also predates an awareness of the consequences of deforestation, which are not really observed until the 1840s. It's on the cusp of these big scientific... The book is a lot about the history of science in it, the Constitution book. But like, they're on the cusp of thinking differently about humanity's place in the world. I mean, historians talk about the 18th century as the era when the human is invented, right? The category of a human is just being invented.
But they also don't have a sense of artificial personhood. They're close to that, right? Frankenstein is 1816, right? Like, we're very... Babbage is 1822.