And welcome. I'm Michael Krasny, and we are talking today to the Commonwealth Club World Affairs program with Jill Lepore. And let me just say, first of all, I'm the host of the Krasny Conversations podcast and former host of Gray Matter with Michael Krasny and KQED Forum. And pleased, very pleased to be joined by Jill Lepore, author of a new book called We the People: A History of the U.S. Constitution.
To tell you something about Jill Lepore: she is, David Woods Kemper, '41 — that's the year he graduated — professor of American history at Harvard University and professor of law at Harvard Law School. She's also a staff writer at The New Yorker, and her many books, I believe this is the 15th, maybe the 16th, we'll find out, include, excuse me, the international bestseller These Truths: A History of the United States.
The Los Angeles Times this week called We the People a life belt for a Constitution under attack, and in it, Lepore argues that the U.S. Constitution was designed to provide a stable foundation for democracy while also providing a nonviolent mechanism for change through amendment. But those amendments have been extremely rare, making it difficult for the government to adapt and solve its problems.
And I must say, personally, I found this book exciting to read. Jill is a very good storyteller and also can give you a crash course in not only con law, but also American history. If you have questions for her, please share them through the YouTube chat. I'll be getting to them a bit later in the program. And welcome, Jill.
Thanks so much. It's delightful to be here.
Delighted to have you here. I guess, so let me start off by asking you about originalism, and I ask you about originalism because that, as you say, animates this book. And the big question that you raised early on, in fact, in your introduction, you say Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, John Quincy Adams came to their view of constitutionalism, and how Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas came to a very different view in the late 20th century, which they nonetheless claim to belong to the late 18th century — is one of the strangest, or excuse me, paradoxes of American constitutional history. Also, one of the questions that animates this book indeed: originalism. How do we get there? How do we get to the point where we are now, where we think we can read the minds of our forefathers and study the Constitution in that spirit?
Well, let me just say at the outset that, you know, I am not an originalist, and I disagree with originalist interpretations of the Constitution, but I think it's a good faith argument. And I think people who subscribe to originalism have good reasons to do so. I think it's a substantive disagreement. It's also a disciplinary disagreement. Right. I'm a historian. Historians are not originalists. Methodologically, the method of originalism, the way that originalists think about the past, is quite different from the methods of my guild, academic history.
But the book is interested, maybe in a slightly different question, which is the history of originalism, as you say: how did we get to a place where originalism is the predominant method of judicial interpretation in our federal judiciary? I think it's important for Americans to think about how odd that is. We are the only country that does this particular thing. And, you know, most nations have written constitutions. So it's an unusual American form of judicial philosophy.
And, you know, part of it is perfectly sensible, right? You have a very old document. You want to know what it means. You are going to read the document, and you're going to read the document quite carefully, right? Any student of history is going to begin there as well, and think about the people that wrote the document and the conditions under which they wrote it, and the ideas — where they got their ideas, the books they read, their lived experience in the world — might be where historians go to next.
But for originalists, the inquiry really ends there, right? So we have a very bounded historical record. If you're an originalist, you want to look at the Constitution, the notes kept by James Madison at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, maybe the records of the ratifying conventions that met in the states, maybe the 85 essays that are now known as the Federalist Papers that argue for the ratification of the Constitution. And these are the places you look to understand the original meaning, intent, and public understanding of the Constitution, depending on the variety of originalism that you practice.
But for historians, the historical record doesn't end there. We're, of course, interested in everyone else — not just the 55 people that are in that room, or just a sizable number of men who participated in the ratifying conventions, but the meaning of that document, the circumstances under which it came to be written, writ large across the whole of the people, people who were disenfranchised at the time. How that document has changed over time, how people's views of it have changed over time, what forces lay behind amendments to it that succeeded and those that failed.
In other words, the point for me in writing the book is just kind of like: the history of the Constitution is not the same as an originalist account of the Constitution. They're just totally different things. And what I want to offer is a historian's account of the history of the Constitution. So folded within that is the story of how originalism emerged.
Well, there are 55 men, as you said — emphasis on men: white men, men of property, men of wealth, holdings and considerable wealth in some cases. And that's where the Constitution, in terms of originalism, seems to fall down. Now, you've given a very nice concession to those who believe in originalism. But as a literary scholar — I hope Americans know I'm a professor of literature — we have something called the intentional fallacy. How can you know? Here's Wimsatt and Beardsley told us what the intentions are of an author, and I certainly subscribe to that. How can we know the intentions of people who wrote something on a parchment, as you put it, that was made out of things that weren't even used anymore in terms of writing and keeping a record of something? So there seems to be a very strong argument against originalism, and yet we live by it in terms of so much judicial review, don't we?
So we absolutely do. But I think there are several arguments you could make. One you have made is it's impossible to really reckon with the intentions of people who wrote a document a very long time ago. Another is even if we could know, should we defer to those? And another would be, did they want us to defer to those? If we decide that their intentions need to be honored, we should be concerned about: did they intend for us to defer to them? And I think the answer to basically all those questions is no.
But the law looks at these questions differently than a literary critic like you would, Michael, or than I would as a historian, because the law is interested in resolving disputes. So, you know, if my grandfather wrote a will and it turned out upon his death that the will had some ambiguity to it, it is the obligation of the executor of his estate who's dealing with that series of bequests in that will to try to determine what his intention was. Right. That is the thing that law does that is different than, well, what did Mark Twain mean when he wrote, you know, X and such a phrase?
So literary critics don't have the obligation to resolve disputes, right? Lawyers do. So that's partly what I mean by good faith. There are real questions about how to interpret an old document, and lawyers have rules and doctrines that they use to do so.
I think originalism, though, exists in this country far outside the law. It is a kind of popular belief, a kind of folklore, right, that the founders are right about everything, and that, you know, if you want to know, is it a violation of the Constitution for a city to pass a code that you can't bring a semi-automatic rifle to an elementary school? Somehow we're supposed to ask what James Madison would think about that. That, I would say, is quite different than the question of resolving the ambiguity in my grandfather's will. Right? I don't think we defer to James Madison on that question. I think there is a body of experience, and there are other measures that we can use to try to understand whether such a municipal code is a good idea and is legal and constitutional.
It makes me think so, almost in a reflexive way, of — you write about some fascinating characters in this book, and I want to get into them, but something like, I'm thinking about all of those fundamentalists, because that's often what they are, who are originalists who believe that it's kind of a sacred document. We have to see it as being completely inviolable, that the language somehow translates into our own language, despite how language has evolved and changed. And that's something that really is difficult for me to grapple with. It's even difficult to grapple with the whole idea of 'We the People.' I mean, what a richly three-word ambiguity that presents for us, because the people were not the same people who created the Constitution. They were not in their minds the people that we think of now as the people, because of amendments and because of progress and change of generations.
Yeah. I mean, their understanding of the people was different than the way we use that word now. Right? We think of the people — we might think of the electorate. We might think of the inhabitants of the, you know, the residents of the United States. We might think of the citizenry, you know, the native-born and naturalized American citizens as constituting the people. They had a narrower view of who the people were. The people were the propertied, the propertied men who could participate in politics, people whose commitment to what it was, in a sense, to be a person under the law was one that required economic independence.
So married women were not persons under the law. They were subsumed under the personhood of their husbands. Women couldn't sign contracts or own property at the time, for instance. So women were not included in that. This was something that was kind of later the subject of a great deal of discussion: could we just sort of by fiat say women are people, or do we need a constitutional amendment to establish the legal personhood of women under the Constitution?
The, you know, 700,000 people held as slaves in the United States in 1787 were not among the people. Poor white men who didn't own enough property to vote — which was not a sizable portion of the population — but they were not subsumed among the people. It's a rhetorical device, and it's a meaningful one. And it is relative to who among the population of nations all over the world in the 18th century had the capacity to participate publicly and politically and participate in the act of governing themselves.
The proportion of the population that is among the people in the 18th-century United States is huge compared to that in other countries. That is part of what is revolutionary about the American Revolution. By our standards, it's a very small portion of the population.
Well, how do we get to rely so much still on the Supreme Court for judicial hegemony or judicial supremacy? Judicial review replacing amendments? There was also the thought that you could do it by just having another convention to make an amendment. That method of revising the Constitution has never really been brought to bear, has it?
No, though it's been threatened often and sometimes with great success at achieving the results that the threat hoped for. The method that the Constitution sets up for constitutional change is the formal amendment process in Article Five of the Constitution, which, excuse me, has not been consummated since 1971, am I correct? It has been used. The 27th Amendment was ratified in 1992, but it is an amendment that was first proposed in 1789. So in a sense, I don't really count it as a kind of new idea about the Constitution. But 1971 was the 26th Amendment ratified, and it lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. Right. In the context of the Vietnam War, where 18-year-olds were drafted but could not vote.
So Article Five is the formal method of constitutional amendment, and it turned out not to work as well or as easily as I believe was intended. And yet the Constitution needs to change. It needs to. There are problems with it that need to be corrected. There are changing circumstances, population changes, changing ideas. So the Constitution has changed a great deal without Article Five amendment as well as with it.
But when Article Five is not working well or is not available for one reason or another, the Constitution most often changes by way of the Supreme Court and its interpretation of the Constitution. And we're in an era right now, because, as you say, the Constitution hasn't been meaningfully amended by Article Five amendment since 1971, we're in an era where Supreme Court appointments are incredibly important, and there's just a great deal of contest over these nominations.
If you think about, you know, Brett Kavanaugh or Clarence Thomas or Robert Bork, you know, how much public interest there was in these confirmation hearings, which, you know, were never even televised really before Bork, and were not even really held before the 1940s. Right. The confirmation was sort of automatic. When the Constitution becomes more difficult to amend by Article Five amendment, Supreme Court appointments take on a disproportionate power, which is one of the imbalances in our constitutional arrangement at the moment. But just one of them.
Are you involved in this amendments project? Could you say something about that? Because it's bringing a lot of things to bear, and you bring in your book a lot of the importance of state constitutions and learning from amendments that didn't get through and failed.
Yeah. You know, I just think it's worth considering what the history of popular constitutional agitation has been. And not because I think it's a — oh, we should look at all the failed amendments, they all should have passed, they were great. You know, most of them are terrible. And like a lot of them are just terrible. There are hundreds of them. A lot of them are wacky ideas. A lot of them are ideas that would be really destructive of equality. A lot of them would reverse rights that have been gained, that are hard-fought gains.
But so there have been about 12,000 amendments to the U.S. Constitution formally introduced on the floor of Congress. And of course, many, many, many, many more, you know, bandied about in newspaper editorials or in magazine pieces or, you know, on social media. It comes and goes. There's not a lot of — like, I think you probably can't think of, like, is there any group right now that's fighting to amend the U.S. Constitution? There's really not, because it's not possible right now; it's effectively impossible. And people fight instead over the Supreme Court for its opinions.
But I think that's exactly what many of our founders, originalists, didn't want to take place. They wanted a dynamic constitution, one changed generation to generation. Jefferson certainly did. Many of the others.
Jefferson certainly did. But they did. They wanted to. It's kind of like both. And, you know, they wanted a constitution to provide stability. They wanted it to last. That's one of the points. There are two reasons to write down a constitution, which was new at the time. It's something that had been practiced in the states, but it was new. One was: England doesn't have a constitution. So when the colonists were frustrated at parliamentary taxation that they described as unconstitutional, they couldn't point to, you know, section four, paragraph one: this is why, you know, your Stamp Act is unconstitutional, this is why the Tea Act is unconstitutional.
So they wanted to write down a constitution — for a lot of other reasons. They wanted to write down a constitution so that it would be transparent, so they could hold their rulers accountable to this frame of government, but they also wanted it to last. And that durability, though, is compromised if a constitution is too brittle, because everything changes. If they knew things were going to need to be changed, that's where they put in an amendment provision, so that you could — they had just been through a terrible, horrible, violent war that lasted many years and caused great suffering, and they did not want to erect a new government in which the only way it would be possible to fundamentally change that government would be by revolution or insurrection.
So amendment is essentially the anti-insurrection mechanism within the Constitution. It is the way to peacefully change the government, some fundamental aspect of the government. They didn't really provide for the Supreme Court overruling acts of Congress or turning back longstanding interpretations of the Constitution or offering wholly new interpretations of the Constitution. But that practice was established fairly early on. It is a longstanding practice.
There are a lot of people who are very angry about it, but they tend to be angry about it only when they don't like the people who are on the court. They're not angry about it in principle. They're angry about the results of judicial activism. So at the moment, because we have a conservative court, liberals are angry about judicial activism. But across history, when the court is liberal, which was the case, you know, from the middle of the 1950s until the 1970s, conservatives were angry about judicial activism and were very interested in amendment. There are not a lot of people whose long careers as activists or politicians or legal scholars really survive this, which is an ideological affinity of the court.
Well, you mentioned Article Five before. Do you still see this, as you call it, a sleeping giant, which is, I believe, what Napoleon called China at one time? And you say it changes when there's war. But then we went for — well, after a couple of hundred years without any amendments. I'm wondering how you see Article Five as a sleeping giant and why?
Because it turns out that amendments over the course of American history have generally come — it's not exactly the rule of three, but in little flourishes. Washington called amendment a constitutional door to be left open to the people. And the door is generally closed. And it's often locked. And there is really no way structurally to amend the Constitution, or there's not a lot of political will to do so, or there are not problems that people think could be addressed by constitutional amendment.
But once an amendment gets through, when someone opens the door, there tends to be, you know, a bit of a rush of people trying to get through the door all at once. So you think about the — well, the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments come all at once. Then essentially the Constitution, the amendment version, goes back to sleep until the Civil War and Reconstruction amendments — the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments — come in a rush. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 come all in a rush. And between 1913 and 1920, there are four amendments ratified, between 1961 and 1971.
But in between these little flurries of activity, there's not just a lot of no amendments getting ratified; there really isn't a lot of amendment proposals being discussed. So it's not entirely clear what triggers — what force actually finally pushes open the door. But some part of it is frustration with the Supreme Court. Right. So the Civil War amendments are only made possible because there's a war, but the war is a consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott in 1857.
And what you say is, I think you intimate in your book, is maybe the most consequential amendment, if you separate the Bill of Rights and those first ten amendments, is the 14th Amendment in terms of its effect and impact?
Yeah. There are plenty of historians who, you know, Eric Foner talks about the 14th Amendment and the 13th and 15th together with it as a second founding. There were a lot of Americans who in the 1860s and '70s thought that Americans would stop celebrating the 4th of July and instead celebrate the date of the ratification of the 14th Amendment, because those three amendments taken together really transformed the Constitution and extend its securities and privileges and immunities to people who had been left out in the way the court at least interpreted the original content, particularly the 14th.
I think of, you know, three-fifths of a man as far as Black people. But women were not even involved in any of these details in terms of the amendments, or certainly until the 19th Amendment, when they were given the franchise to vote, were sort of absent.
And what I'm struck by in your book, I think of a line from Adrienne Rich, a poem of hers, which is called 'Diving into the Wreck,' where she talks about the books in which our names do not appear. You've taken a lot of names that have not appeared in the history books or appeared only tangentially and are obscure, essentially, especially where women are concerned, but also where Blacks are concerned and where Indigenous people are concerned. And you said what you really have said is these are an important part of this American history. We need to understand the contributions they made, what they had to offer, what they did, what impact they had, and so forth. And it's very detailed and it's frankly wonderful to read because it's a different kind of history, almost. And so we're almost a revisionism of history from that originalism.
It's — I love that you mentioned Adrienne Rich. I read that poem maybe freshman year of college and it really affected me. I spent a lot of time reading her papers here at Harvard at the Houghton Library, those that are open; most of her papers are still restricted. I'm fascinated by Rich. Yeah. You know what I mean? I really wanted to offer up — I really don't think we can have really a democratic future until we have a more democratic past.
And that is to say, the revolution in American history and research and writing that began in the 1960s and '70s with, you know, generations of — a new generation of Black historians, Chicano historians, Asian-American historians, women historians, people who came from the gay rights movement, disability scholars — really has exploded the story that we tell about American history and makes legible the conflicts that we have inherited and the comedy that we have inherited as a nation and as a people.
And we're living in a moment where the very tremendous contributions of that era of historical research, especially archival research, is very much under threat. Where there are states in this union where, you know, talking about racial conflict over the course of American history or ethnic difference and how it affected voting patterns and, you know, elections of decades ago, these things are no longer salable in certain classroom terms. And let's be blunt about this: we have a president who wants to essentially change what's in the Smithsonian and maybe the whole way that American history is presented.
And by the way, it should be added here that, as you point out in your book, Alexander Hamilton, no less, wanted the president to serve for life. So our present president would be in agreement with Hamilton, I guess. Probably wouldn't.
I mean, again, like where I think that you — I would absolutely see that there are plenty of people who can defend originalism as a mode of judicial interpretation. I would argue with them. But I think there's a defense to say, like, you know, these are the important documents. These are the ones we need to read because these are the ones that carry the meaning that is relevant to the law.
You cannot defend that as a historian. You cannot say, oh, the only history — and this is where I think the bleed comes right from originalism to the larger culture — oh, the only history that can be taught, the only history that we need to know, the only history that we need to read, that our children need to know, is essentially that. This is the sort of fictive ancestry that is originalism, that we really only need to know about these people without those people.
I really was struck in reading — you know, Robert Bork was once asked, you know, just how constrained is your available historical record for understanding the Constitution? And someone said, if a scholar found a letter written by George Washington to Martha Washington explaining what he meant by direct taxes, would that be available to you to understand the meaning of direct taxes? And he said, no, like, absolutely not. That's irrelevant to our understanding of this phrase. Even if, you know, Washington, who presided over the Constitutional Convention, had written it.
And what I think he could not fathom is the possibility that Martha Washington, or people held on Mount Vernon as slaves, or people in nearby towns in Virginia who were poor farmers, tobacco farmers, or indentured servants of other tobacco farmers — that the ideas of anyone else about taxation could possibly matter to our understanding of the Constitution.
Again, like, you can say as an originalist, as a judge, I don't care about that. As a historian, you can't say that. As a teacher of history, you can't say that. All of those ways that Americans have believed, fought over, or contested, agitated for interpretations of the Constitution are part of our constitutional past.
Well, one thing that's not a part of it is God and Christianity. And we've had the separation of church and state, and there are many who would say that there was a Christian amendment movement that you read about, for example, and many would say now this is something that maybe should be done. It's time that it came to pass. We've had the death of Charlie Kirk, who's a martyr to Christian nationalism. A lot of certainly fervor around that issue and so forth. Address for us, if you could, the — so you say — the possible ambiguity of church and state or Christianity being separate from our Constitution.
Yeah, I think that's a tricky one for constitutional conservatives, because the 18th-century record isn't an especial help. You know, there were attempts even from the get-go. You know, Benjamin Rush, I think it is, famously wrote to John Adams upon reading the Constitution. He said, you know, you guys did a great job down there in Philadelphia, but like, you forgot one thing: you forgot to mention God. And, you know, I hope you're going to fix that soon. Like, that's good. That could be amended pretty easily.
And they didn't forget, right? They offered up a different document. And they also ratified as the first of the amendments that were proposed our First Amendment, establishing freedom of religion and freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom to petition. These were the fundamental freedoms that those Americans who did not love the Constitution wanted to be sure were added to it. First of all, that is a really meaningful history.
And it's not that there hasn't been a lot of contestation over the absence of the language of a Christian God in particular in the Constitution, because it's kind of been an evergreen. When the Civil War broke out, the Confederate Constitution, I believe, does mention God, and it definitely does. Some Union ministers said, we're losing this war because our Constitution doesn't have God in it, and we better fix that right away so we can win the war because we've offended God.
And so that's the first sort of real movement, not just kind of occasional thoughts and concerns, but there is a genuine movement for a God amendment to the Constitution. But it is immediately answered, almost immediately answered, by a movement to counter that movement, by adding a more enhanced religious freedom amendment to the Constitution that is led by a number of people, including a rabbi in the Midwest who, you know, cherishes America's record of freedom of religion and the non-establishment of religion, you know, what you refer to as a separation of church and state.
And these two forces do battle for decades. And in the decades after the Civil War, there's a kind of hilarious — I think it's a newspaper story in the 1890s where some guy's reporting what it's like in the lobby outside the halls of Congress, and he's like, you have on the one side all these people that want to put God in the Constitution, and then you have all these other people who want to make sure those other people don't put God in the Constitution, and they're sort of locked in a battle forever. And no one's listening to either of them. Like, the status quo ante is kind of what Congress is fine with.
But, you know, it is — it has been an ongoing struggle in American public life that, since — there have been from the start Christians who believe the Constitution does not sufficiently recognize Christianity, and there from the start Americans who were opposed to that.
Yeah, yeah. And you mentioned cartoons. You've got a lot of cartoons going back to the beginning. I mean, this was a whole research project in itself, I imagine. Why isn't it?
Oh, the visual stuff. Yeah. You know, the Library of Congress has this incredible collection of political cartoons. There's just far more than one could possibly use. You could really tell the story of Americans' arguments over the Constitution through political cartoons.
And I'm also wondering, every time there's a presidential election, you hear one person, one vote. That's the way it should be, that maybe, in fact, even with some people who feel they know the intentions of the Founding Fathers had in mind. And yet the Electoral College exists, and there's a whole history in your book that goes into why it exists and continues to exist, having to do with slavery. And — yeah. I'm sorry. I don't know what happened there. We just went blank for a minute. Maybe because we're talking about the Electoral College. Somebody undermined us. You know, we live in a paranoid age. But I know we've got to get you out of here and get you to class on time, and I have every intention of doing it. But people who have questions, please post them. But my last question was about the Electoral College and why — you know, we've seen these polls that show that maybe it's time to retire the Electoral College. And yet — sorry — it seems impossible because of the amendments being impossible.