Hi everybody. Morning. Hi. Thank you. Thank you. I don't know about you, but I woke up this morning and I briefly thought it was Sunday. So, things are just moving along. It's been really wonderful. Thanks to all of you. Quick announcement: Derek Thompson, who did get his plane, finally got in yesterday, and as I mentioned, we rescheduled his breakout from yesterday morning, and it's going to be today at 12:30 to 1:15 in Limelight BC during the lunch hour, and you bring your lunches if you wish. It should be a great session.
Now I am incredibly excited for this next event. If you've read Jill Lepore, and I bet that's most of you, then you know that she has a habit of taking a fundamental concept that we think we fundamentally understand and showing us that we never really understood it at all. She did it with the Constitution in her masterful books, These Truths and We the People: A History of the US Constitution, which won this year's Pulitzer Prize in history. She's done it in her New Yorker pieces for over 20 years, a body of work that's justly earned her a reputation as one of the most illuminating minds writing about American ideas today.
Now she's trained that same probing intellect on a somewhat unexpected target: the data-driven world we've already moved into, whether we know it or not. Her new book, The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State, it's coming out in just a couple of weeks, is about how much of our lives, our politics, and our sense of who's in charge has been handed over to the machines and the people who built them. Frankly, it's frightening. And yet, through it all, as only she can do, she makes a case that's actually hopeful. History isn't driven by machines. It's driven by people and ideas. Which means the grip this technology has on us is not inevitable. To talk about it all, please join me in welcoming Jill Lepore in conversation with that brilliant multi-hyphenate and National Book Award winner Evan Osnos.
Thank you very much, John. And thank you all of you and welcome back. And it is a special pleasure, one I've been looking forward to for a long time, to be back in conversation with my friend Jill Lepore. I feel required to say this every time: my outrageously, ludicrously talented friend Jill Lepore. As you heard a moment ago, she recently won the Pulitzer Prize for History. And yes, exactly. I just, when I heard this, I thought this is a recognition that is so richly deserved that the award citation in beautiful calligraphy will just say, 'Duh.'
But Jill, in addition to being a historian, you may not know this, this is the fun part about today, is that she also devotes a lot of time to studying questions of technology and questions of the natural world, and this book brings those three themes together. It is about democracy. It is about the world we inhabit as creatures, as people. And it is, of course, about this new era we are entering in terms of technology. On Saturday, you guys heard, many of you heard Sebastian Mallaby talking about what goes on in the mind of the founder of an AI company. What motivates somebody to, as the saying has it, put the fate of the world, all of our fate, into his hands. And that's exactly where this book picks up. How did it exactly happen that we ended up putting so much of our fates in the hands of so few? And where's that taking us? And ultimately, what does it mean for our ability to govern ourselves? These are the questions before us.
I want to start before we define this term, the artificial state, which is really at the core of this conversation. I want to actually get a better understanding of your sense of technology. I think people might misread this at the outset to say, 'Oh, well, Jill's anti-tech.' But actually, as you write in this book, you start quite admiringly talking about the technological marvels in scientific research, communication, education, medicine and public health, urban planning, architecture, ocean and space exploration, and a thousand other realms of human endeavor. So, where does this specific concern emerge? When did that happen for you?
Well, first, thanks for doing this, Evan. It's such an honor to share a stage with you again. And thanks everyone for coming out again on this beautiful day in this really truly beautiful place that I just feel I want to celebrate the mountains and the sky and the trees and the desert and the horses and this place. I'm really not a Luddite, and I have to say, my husband's not here, but I'm married to a computer scientist. Yeah, that is a dirty secret that has been revealed. Jill was married to a researcher at MIT. Like, I just, I'm not anti, like I'm fascinated by that world of exploration. And like when we were first dating in the '90s, like hidden Markov models and what would become one day become large language models were undergoing a kind of slow revolution. When Google was just beginning to do page search, like I have always been, you know, an armchair observer of the evolution of computer science. That's, it's always been really interesting to me and also fascinating to me the way in which it has been taken by humanists as so alien, when in fact there's so much about human experience of the world that the use of machines can help us to understand. Right?
So, I do really think, like, I'm just really holding out for when artificial intelligence and pattern detection can decode elephant gestural language. Like, I'm so excited about that. Like, there's so much at the frontiers of knowledge of the natural world that especially new tools are making available to us. It's like living with the emergence of Newtonian physics. So, you know, the Copernican revolution. I think there's that. And I wish for humanists that we had more capacity and weren't so beaten down and exhausted and under-resourced and jobless, that we could... It does wear on you that the revolution in our capacity to understand the world was something that we could all be celebrating instead of it feeling like intellectual theft.
And in fact, so much of it is intellectual theft, right? The kind of copyright piece of it. So yeah, I think I made that statement early in the book because one of the ways that Silicon Valley has very effectively silenced critics is, 'You're a Luddite, you know, you're an idiot.' You're an idiot maybe more than you're a Luddite, but that travels better on the internet because otherwise people have to look up Luddite, they don't. I mean, I just think like that's a, it's like a very easy way to be dismissive of criticism. But I do, you know, we were talking a little bit about this, like, you know, I do ask Claude what I should make for dinner if I have mushrooms and miso.
Michael Pollan might have an idea for you.
And that's all that I have. And I think what an incredible waste. And I feel terrible about it because really I wish that were being exclusively used to understand the changing temperature of the oceans, right? Like, I love these tools. I just don't see why they're available to me.
That's the key point. The key point is about the proper use of these tools. That's really what we're talking about. About getting beyond this idea that suddenly AI is like a vapor that goes into everything. Let's figure out where we want it and where we don't. You describe a moment for you. I think you called it my Sputnik moment, meaning your wake-up call. The sense where you realize we're entering a new period. And that was when ChatGPT came out in 2022. What did that mean for you? What began to come into focus at that point?
Yeah. So, just to remind everybody about Sputnik in 1957, when the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite. Is anybody watching For All Mankind? Anybody been watching? All right. You guys are not going to get my references at all. But anyway, it really unsettled the United States and especially the Eisenhower White House that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in the exploration of space and therefore in missile technology. And so, you know, Kennedy ran in 1960 on the supposed missile gap that was so, so... but it was broadcast on the news. You could even hear it from the ground, this beep, beep, beep. And people, like, it was like when the US went to the moon, except it was the Soviets who went to space.
And it freaked people out because it seemed like it was the ushering in of a new era in the history of humanity. And it was talked about by the press in that way, but in a very dark way because it was the Soviets who are bringing us to that new era. So it had all these kind of national security concerns. And to some degree the ChatGPT emergence in 2022 immediately had kind of national security concerns, but it was very much greeted as a wonder and a wonder of American ingenuity in particular. But then when you read a little bit more about it, there's the whole backstory of how all the people at OpenAI who had left to found Anthropic because they didn't think it was something that should be released to the public yet because it was potentially so dangerous and it would be accelerating these developments that had possibly disastrous, human extinction-level long-term consequences. So, it was both like... and some of Sputnik had that as well, right? The human extinction-level consequences because it was the height of the Cold War and, oh, if they can launch Sputnik then they can do a first strike and we won't be able to retaliate because they'll have an iron shield up there and humanity will become extinct. And so they kind of had, I think in some ways, both gone to the same catastrophic discourse really quickly.
And I had fairly recently written a book. I wrote this book that came out during the pandemic, and so no one read it or has ever heard of it, but it's called If Then, and it's a history of the first data science company that was founded in 1959, right after Sputnik. And it was these guys, admin and political scientists and computer scientists, who invented this thing called the People Machine, where they thought they could sort of machine... they could replace essentially democracy with a machine. Yeah. And they were quite successful for a time until they went bankrupt because they just didn't have enough data about people. So I had just really been thinking about that story, was kind of bouncing around in my head. And when ChatGPT emerged, it sort of immediately made clear that the wildest fantasies of the people that invented the People Machine were now realized. There was both enough data, enough processing speed, that there were ways to reproduce a state, create an artificial state that would supplant the liberal democratic nation state.
It's fitting that we're talking about it on the 250th right here. We are at a moment of reflection about the, shall we say, the condition of the liberal nation state, and we are confronting the advent of what you've called, and I think it really is a powerful term, the artificial state. For people who say, 'Okay, I don't understand what that means,' put it into concrete terms for us. What is the artificial state? And it's already happened, it's actually already in existence, and I wonder what that looks and feels like to you.
Yeah, I mean, part of the reason I wrote the book, which I wrote in this, like, I wrote last summer. I was like just a little insane last summer. And by the way, some people go to the beach. I just was in this total fugue state of like, how, I mean, I feel like a lot of people feel this way. Like, how is this happening? Like, who voted for these people? Yeah. What the hell is going on? Like, I just... that's a good question. I was just, I had lost it, and you know, I had just written this book about the history of the US Constitution, which, you know, for all of the tumult in our politics, I really care about written constitutions and the observance of the rule of law. I really admire our constitutional system. I mourn the dismantlement. And so I just, I'd spent years writing this history of the Constitution, and I thought, I'm just watching its irrelevance, its utter irrelevance in the face of... I mean, I don't know if people observed that Anthropic wrote a constitution for Claude this past year. You know, it's sort of a reiteration of Facebook after the 2016 election, Facebook started a Supreme Court. Sam Altman at OpenAI thinks that an AI president would be a good idea. I'm just watching the most powerful people in the world, most powerful corporations ever created, the richest people, no one knows better than Evan Osnos the extent of the wealth of these individuals and their corporations, and they're just kind of routinely like, we have our own Supreme Court, we have our own constitution, we'll have our own president. We also own public discourse.
Every person on the planet receives their news, whether they have other sources of news additionally, but they receive their news through social media companies that are owned by private corporations and are entirely dominated by robots. There are more robots on every social media platform than there are humans, and that has been the case for many years now. So the artificial state is the supplanting of the liberal democratic constitutional democracy with an artificial state that is privately owned by multinational corporations who have replaced public discourse with machine-based politics. And I'm not talking Boss Tweed machine, with kind of a bot-dominated public discourse in which, if you think about this coming election, so AI is on the ballot in a lot of places because of the really important data center debates, but increasingly, as you'll see if you read the newspaper, there's been great reporting on this, the ad campaigns run by political candidates and their campaigns are produced by artificial intelligence, the campaign strategies are written by artificial intelligence, and increasingly voters are asking chatbots how to vote. Yeah. And their voting decisions are about issues involving artificial intelligence. So we are essentially living in an artificial state that has been the fantasy of these crazy kooky man-boys for 30 years. Like, this is where I get to the how did this happen? And I could just keep asking that question over and over.
So that's why I wrote the book, because partly I wanted to have a name for it. Yeah. And that's why, like, I'm not sure artificial state is the right name, like a lot of people have called this, like, well, it was the algorithmic state or, you know, but I just wanted to have a way to talk about it, and so that's why...
There are a host of incredibly revealing statistics in this book, and I'll just give you folks one. According to the Pew Research Center, 97% of all the tweets posted by American adults about American politics were posted by fewer than 10% of all the users on Twitter. Meaning 97% of the tweets are coming from 10%. And the algorithm is optimized to show us those people. And when you look at their attitudes, they tend to be on the extremes. So you have a very, it's essentially like a constant primary. We are all living in a political primary all the time. And you mentioned a moment ago sort of how did this happen over the last 30 years. One of the things the book does, which I find amazing, is to go back and actually say, you know what, if you really want to understand how this happened, you have to go back to the very beginning of the use of numbers in statecraft, the census, right? I mean, the word statistics comes because it was numbers used by states. Why do you go back all the way to the beginning of the census, the counting of heads, to understand the origins of this fascinating phenomenon?
I think partly that's just my own proclivity. Like, I'm like, if I want to know where something came from, yeah, I don't want to know like, you know, like everything that you see. I went to see The Odyssey last night, and I was like, somehow this is going to feel like it's about Trump to me, and it kind of killed me. Like everything feels like it's the immediate prehistory of the present. Yeah. And for me as a historian, it's just like really important to go into an unrecognizable distant past so that I'm not committing, you know, the gravest historical fallacy of teleology, and like just trying to look for the origins of where we are now, but it's trying to kind of understand how the past worked.
So it is a really important part of the world that we live in, you know, which political scientists will call the administrative state and conservatives will call the deep state. But where, you know, we do have social security numbers, and we've had them in the United States since the 1930s, and those are about the government keeping track of the population and understanding tax rates and providing benefits, provision of benefits for the elderly and the unemployed. Like there are all kinds of reasons we have a number attached to us. But going back to the 1930s wouldn't explain exactly how that happens. Like, what is it? In fact, you can't have a state or an empire without the capacity to count the people. You certainly can't have a democracy because people have to be counted and have their votes counted. But you can't actually have a powerful administrative state because you need to be able to know how much money you have if you tax these people at what rate and how many young men you have to go to war with. Like, that's just kind of how a state aggregates itself.
And so I was trying to sort of answer for myself the question of what's the relationship between quantification and the formation of states, because we're in a different era now, right? It's not just that we have social security numbers, that we consist as citizens essentially of our personal data. So to understand that, like, you have to understand some things that came before that.
Of data, in a sense. I mean, look, when Brad Parscale, Trump's digital director in 2016, said, quote, 'I pretty much used Facebook to get Trump elected,' what he was saying was, this is the power of data. This is the power of knowing who is out there, classifying them, and we'll get to this in a moment, but then predicting their behavior. And there's a turn in that history. But one of the fascinating things is you mentioned robots a moment ago. We are now sort of in this era of bots of all kinds. I mean, the reason why you are asked to click a CAPTCHA every time, you know, that thing that you're supposed to say, 'I'm not a robot,' the reason you're asked to click that is because there are so many bots out there. This is one of the things that you've developed in this book, which is fascinating. The idea of robots, though, where did this come from? Why, when did we decide that, you know what, for all the kind of amazing things we have in the human body, what we should really do is create some artificial versions of ourselves?
Yeah. I mean, I think it largely, I mean, one of the things I say about my notion of the artificial state is that it exists as a fantasy long before it's a plan, and certainly very long before it's a business plan that becomes... how this thing that is throughout human history is the darkest of fantasies, is the creation of an artificial man, right? Like Satan is an artificial man. Like, we can go back to the most ancient tales of any culture, and there are, you know, people made out of clay, right? The golem. Like, there just, there's a, every culture has a version of the creation of an artificial man.
How that really begins to become part of our imagining in a more concrete sense emerged over the course of the 19th century. I mean, Frankenstein is 1816. And that's very much part of that discourse. But the sense in the 19th century in the West that history, there was a new kind of theory of how change happens. Those were the, like, previous to the 18th century, there really was no idea of progress. Right? There's really... everything is about salvation, right? It's a journey from sin to salvation. All stories are a journey from sin to salvation. Maybe you don't make it to salvation. But the 18th century introduces the secular notion of progress. And then in the 19th century, the Darwinian idea of evolution emerges, but also the idea of progress not as moral progress as Enlightenment philosophers talked about it in kind of Panglossian, like the world is getting better and better and better, but as technological progress. And this is the kind of whole emergence in the culture of the technological sublime of the 19th century that is foundational to our Silicon Valley cosmology today, right? But so when people started thinking about change exists as technological progress, and I would say like this is endemic now, like if you ask young people like what is progress, it's like which version of the iPhone do you have, do you know what I mean? Like there's not, it's not like are there higher literacy rates, has the poverty rate gone down globally, it's not even like GDP, like it's like we only really think about progress in technological terms now. But that starts in the 19th century, and so then people began to imagine like kind of combining the idea of evolution and the idea that change happens through technology with the idea that one day our machines would evolve and we would create machines that were smarter than we are. And so you see that already by the 1860s that there would be one, but the word robot isn't coined until 1920. But people talk about artificial men all the time in the 19th century.
And what we're building towards, and to remind us, by the way, where we started, which is, Joe was describing all the ways in which technological marvels have made our lives better. This is not a screed against technology. Protein folding, the diseases that will be cured, the drugs that will be discovered. What we're talking about is the proper use of technology. And I want to understand that through the story of somebody who most people will not have heard about, whose name was Joshua Haldeman, or as he called himself, Technocrat Number 10450-1. Who is Joshua Haldeman and why do we care about him now?
So Joshua Haldeman was born in Minnesota, was a Minnesota amateur aviator in the '20s and farmer, and he lost his farm during the Depression. Well, he had moved to Saskatchewan by then, so he's Canadian, and he had four children. And he, in the 1930s, was a founder of and a Canadian national chairman of a political movement known as Technocracy Incorporated. And these were, it's mostly men, engineers, scientists who called themselves technocrats, and they did not believe in democracy. In the great crisis of the 1930s, with the Depression, of the rise of fascism in Europe, was like, how can nation states survive this, the economic dislocations of industrialism? And you know, some countries, democracies died all over the world, some turned to fascism, some turned to communism. Democracy was on the rocks in the United States. It's only through really the exertions of FDR and his administration that democracy survived in the United States. But the technocrats believed that democracy should be abandoned and technocracy should take its place. There would be no banks. There would be no politics. Society would be run by engineers and scientists, and they would have this unit of energy that people would be accorded, something like a universal basic income. And everyone would have a number instead of a name. And so they all had numbers. They dressed in gray suits. They drove identical gray cars. They had these big parades. It was very big in the American West, which is also where the Klan was very big, unsurprisingly, and it was big in Canada. It eventually collapses and is outlawed in Canada. Haldeman in the 1940s is arrested by the Canadian government because technocracy has been outlawed. He's also barred entry into the United States in, I think, 1948 for being a subversive, because technocrats wanted to end the democratic nation state. He then, because technocracy is outlawed in Canada in 1948, that I think it's also the year South Africa announces its policy of apartheid, which he finds very attractive, he moves his family to Pretoria, South Africa, where he becomes a vocal proponent of apartheid. He's a very prolific conspiracy theorist. He self-publishes a newsletter and all these pamphlets, anti-Semitic pamphlets. And he is also Elon Musk's grandfather.
I'm going to let that settle in. Let that settle in.
Elon Musk is born in South Africa in 1971. His grandfather dies in an airplane accident when he's just a toddler. I don't think he, you know, he couldn't have known him very well, but that is their family history. And if you look at what Musk has done, you know, from the aviation forward, the conspiracy theorizing, the self-publicizing, the racial fear-mongering, the abolition of banks, the abolition of politics, the replacement of democracy with technocracy, all those ideas are just regurgitated. Like, one of the things I point out is the ideas of Silicon Valley people like Musk are not the future. They are the worst and most discredited ideas of the past.
One of the things you point out is that in some ways Musk's grandfather, he distributed his pamphlets, he handed out his kind of eccentric ideas to people where he could meet them, and it had this kind of finite radius of impact. But his grandson was able to buy a piece of technology that is so exquisitely engineered that it can not only reach people on the other side of the world, it can get into our minds, it can figure out what we like to see and then feed us more of it. So in a way the tool is what separates the generations in that case.
That tool and the power of a machine in our political life also appears when we begin to try to understand the impact of polling in this country. You know, it kind of washes over us. We live in this sea of polling. You know, you're constantly rating your Uber driver on a scale of 1 to 5 or whatever it is. But this idea was a kind of bombshell idea, right? I mean, around in the 1930s, help us understand how this happened and where you think it's kind of lost its way in how it's used in this country.
Yeah. So I mean, like many of the elements of the artificial state, it starts off perfectly innocently. And actually is like a helpful thing. So sort of like how do things get so out of control is a question that I keep asking. The scientific polling, self-described, begins in 1935 when George Gallup, who was a newspaper guy, founds the American Institute for Public Opinion Research in Princeton so that people think it's a Princeton organization specifically with the university. It's not. He had started out by trying to help newspapers understand which of their articles were being read more, and so that they could decide which piece should be on the front page, doing the kind of data analytics that like A/B headlining that like every media organization, you know, started doing like maybe 20 years ago. He had a kind of pre-computer version of doing that. He had this really interesting way to measure people's response to stuff that they were reading. And so he started claiming that he could assess scientifically the opinion of the public through door-knocking campaigns. So, previous to...
Scientific polling, let's say, Evan, you're running for office, okay? You're running for state senator, and you have a campaign manager and like a campaign staff, and they're trying to figure out like which precincts do we really need to do some legwork in.
They would just kind of go out into the neighborhoods, right? You go to like a basketball court, PTA meeting, union meeting, you know, the chamber of commerce, talk to some businessmen, go along a storefront, just kind of canvassing.
Just deciding like where should we like we're going to buy a newspaper ad or a radio spot. Would it should be in this town, that town. Um, it's not scientific, right? It's a lot of legwork. It takes a lot of time. Um, what Gallup was trying to suggest was that you could do that more efficiently and more quickly and more cheaply by hiring a polling organization that could take a scientifically, a quantitatively representative sample of the population of the state and figure out like, and also divide the state up by its characteristics, you know, Catholic housewives, um, union members who live in urban areas, whatever, and figure out exactly where you need to target your time as a campaign. And it is a more efficient achievement, and it certainly early on when people were knocking on doors and asking 45 minutes worth of questions, it was quite accurate. Um, polling stopped being as accurate when people stopped having landlines. Like there's a whole crisis of polling with the invention of cell phones, right? You just couldn't get people to answer the phone anymore. So the only people who are getting polled are the people who are answering a random call on their cell phone.
Yeah, we're in their hands, folks. Those are the people.
Well, in fact, you can't poll on cell phones. There was a rule you couldn't do that. So it's only people who are answering the landlines, which, I apologize to the community here, tends to be people that might have a landline still and answer like a 45-minute phone call. Like that's not representative. So they had to overweight. You know, if you get like one young Latino guy, you have to count that 4,000 times. What do you have like, you know, one 81-year-old resident of a nursing home? She just counts once. Like they do all these kind of... Anyway, polling is not that accurate anymore. But the point that I think analysts of what polling has done and not done for American politics missed out on is all those conversations that your campaign might have had.
Yeah, you know, in the playground, at the, you know, book club, at the union hall. Those are the glue of civil society. So it's not unlike... I was just at this fantastic panel on local news and what the decay of local news organizations and the closing of local newspapers all over the country in the last 30 years has meant to American civic culture. Just that knowing stuff about your neighbors, having conversations with your neighbors, that was a thing that political campaigns used to be part of too. And when you strip that out, there isn't even really polling anymore in the sense of no one's being called. If you're running for state senator now, you just have an AI data guy who's going to tell you like, they're just going to like automatically send out whatever messages need to be sent out to whatever people on whatever social media platform they're on with a particular personalized targeted message.
And a corporation's going to make a lot of money off of that, but it's going to be destructive of the common weal. There was a great expression I remember Arthur Miller once said that a newspaper is a nation talking to itself. The key word there is talking, not shouting at each other, not trolling each other. It's people talking, meaning seeing each other as citizens, as co-inhabiting a political commons where you've got to figure out how to make it work. And when you lose those mediating spaces, whether it's a newspaper or face-to-face contact, or you're encountering each other only on Twitter, you see each other differently. You have a great line. You say, 'Liberal democratic states make citizens. The artificial state makes trolls.' It rewards the extreme view, the performative entry. So that's kind of beginning to get us closer to where we are. And then you have a big turn in this story, which is actually you don't see this as an inevitability. You don't see this ultimately becoming the reality that we inhabit without wanting to. And I'm curious how it is that you can see this growth and then you also see a way in which this thing, this artificial state, this set of ways in which we are slicing and dicing one another into our most reductive form, that also feels doomed to you.
Yeah, it does feel doomed to me, and I kind of have to insist on that to keep my sanity. But I also, I mean, I guess there would be two ways in which I think it's doomed. One is narratively it's doomed. So the first half of the book is the rise of the artificial state, and the second half is the fall. And the first half is really kind of a history of science and the relationship between science and state, and the second half is really a history of science fiction. And in every story told about an artificial state, and I call this the parable of the artificial state, it's like everywhere in science fiction. I mean, you know, you would think about the Terminator, but like there's a lot of other science fiction, especially dating back to the immediate era of the aftermath of the devastation of the First World War. People inevitably build an artificial state, and then it destroys the natural world, and then people have to rebel in order to fight for the ability to live on the planet. So there's something... the artificial state in the science fiction story never endures.
It's always crushed. I mean, it may take everybody with it, but it always fails. It is doomed to fail. Okay, we might all go, but it would be comforting to know that like the machines don't go on without us.
But there are internal contradictions in a sense. I mean, one of the things... there's a great moment. Some folks might remember this. I doubt you will, but a couple years ago, there was a writer for The Onion, Jill highlights this in the book, a guy named Alex Blaustein, who tweeted something making fun of a trend we were seeing in Silicon Valley. And he tweeted this. He wrote, 'Sci-fi author: In my book, I invented the Torment Nexus as a cautionary tale. Tech company: At long last, we have created the Torment Nexus from classic sci-fi novel Don't Create the Torment Nexus.' There is a feeling in the air, and I think even since you started writing this you were picking up on it, was a kind of premonition of a mood that people are beginning... we see it even in this crowd here, people are beginning to say, I want to have a little bit of a sense of control about how I use these technologies and how they are used by others on me. Is that one of the things that you think... are we in the throes of a liberal democratic response in a sense to an artificial moment?
Yeah, I do think that's really possible. And this too came up in this fantastic panel I was at this morning, which is a kind of very local response to data centers that people are like, wait, I didn't vote for this, I didn't even know about it because we don't have a newspaper. And it's a kind of interesting intersection of the crisis of local news and the crisis of the emergence of the artificial state, because what those data centers are going to be doing is replacing what little sense of control you have over your own existence that is left. And so I think the opposition to data centers is, I mean, some of it's just NIMBYism, but I think a lot of it is just like a gestalt. It's just like, just wait, hold on. Like I already am still trying to get social media out of my kid's bedroom. Like I can't cuddle with my toddler in the morning because I have to check my email. Like people are pissed off. Like now there's going to be a data center where there used to be like a national park. Like there's... I think there's a... And nobody asked. Nobody asked.