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Jill Lepore
Professor of American History and Law; Staff Writer, The New Yorker, Harvard University

Jill Lepore | The Artificial State

📅 Oct 29, 2026 Toronto Public Library 50 MIN 184 VIEWS 119 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
Pulitzer-Prize winning historian Jill Lepore discusses her new book The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State, in conversation with Professor Sanjay Ruparelia, in the Appel Salon on October 1, 2026

What Jill Lepore said

Written from the verified transcript and checked against it. Every figure links to the moment it was said.

Jill Lepore argued that the rise of artificial intelligence and the destruction of the natural world are challenges that 18th-century constitutions cannot address. She traced the historical roots of the 'artificial state' to the 1960s California counterculture, which merged libertarianism with a worship of machines, leading to an unregulated internet and social media. Lepore criticized the US Congress for abdicating its legislative duty over decades, allowing tech corporations to act like nation-states and cloak themselves in democratic language, such as Facebook's 'Supreme Court' and Anthropic's 'constitution' for Claude. She dismissed the recent non-binding agreement between President Trump and tech moguls as a corrupt bargain, not constitutionalism. Lepore rejected the 'pacing problem' excuse for regulatory inaction, arguing that 40 years of neglect, not technological speed, is the real issue. She also downplayed the US-China AI race, citing historical evidence that first movers rarely control outcomes.

Key takeaways

  1. Lepore argues 18th-century constitutions are inadequate to address the challenges of AI and environmental destruction.
  2. Tech moguls' use of constitutional language, like Facebook's 'Supreme Court' and Anthropic's 'constitution', is a cloak for democratic legitimacy without democratic process.
  3. Lepore rejects the 'pacing problem' excuse, arguing that 40 years of inaction, not technological speed, is the real barrier to regulation.

Numbers and commitments

FigureWhat it refers toTypeAt
2027 Year Musk wants to release a million Optimus robots timeline 39:18
2050 Year Musk wants more humanoid robots than humans timeline 39:18
1984 Year Apple released the Macintosh timeline 19:50
2004 Year Facebook was started timeline 21:41
2006 Year Twitter was started timeline 21:41
2007 Year iPhone was released timeline 21:41
2022 Year ChatGPT was released timeline 23:28
1935 Year US social security program was established timeline 15:49
1980 Year Reagan was elected president timeline 18:49
2015 Year of Brexit timeline 25:50

Chapters

  1. 0:00Opening remarks and context
  2. 6:25Why she wrote the book
  3. 17:08The California ideology and libertarianism
  4. 25:02The rise of the artificial state
  5. 26:05Tech moguls and constitutional language
  6. 32:20Comparison to other transformative technologies
  7. 36:44Science fiction as instruction manual
  8. 43:16The pacing problem and regulatory inaction
  9. 48:32US-China AI competition

Questions asked in this interview

4
  1. 35:46Can you tell me a little bit about that?
  2. 42:55How do you think about that dilemma?
  3. 47:43But one thing we haven't talked about, so it seems like there's two different competitions that are pushing against the regulation, right?
  4. 48:32... is, 'Well, but China's now developing it, so we can't let China break through, because if it breaks through to some super intelligence, then it could sort of capture all the gains.' And how do you think about that axis of competition?
Host 0:16 ↗
This is our opening event of the Frontlines of Democracy series for the season. It's the 45th, I believe, in the series that we began in 2019. So it's just wonderful to see such a good turnout for this first one for this new season.
It's an immense pleasure to introduce our speaker and the subject of her talk this evening. Jill Lepore is the David Woods Kemper Professor of American History at Harvard University, where she's also Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School and a staff writer for The New Yorker.
Much of her scholarship explores absences and asymmetries in the historical record, with a particular emphasis on the history and technology of evidence.
A wide-ranging and prolific essayist, Professor Lepore is the author of many award-winning books that have gone on to become national bestsellers.
The most recent include These Truths: A History of the United States, published in 2018, an international bestseller named as one of Time magazine's top 10 nonfiction books of the decade.
If Then: How the Simulmatics Corporation Invented the Future, published in 2020, longlisted for the National Book Award, and We the People: A History of the US Constitution, a New York Times bestseller published in 2025.
In addition to her writing for The New Yorker, Jill's essays and reviews have appeared in The New York Times, the Times Literary Supplement, the Journal of American History, Foreign Affairs, the Yale Law Journal, American Scholar, and American Quarterly, and that's just a few. And many of these have been translated into German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Latvian, Swedish, French, Chinese, and Japanese, and widely anthologized.
A past president of the Society of American Historians and a former commissioner of the Smithsonian's National Portrait Gallery, Professor Lepore is a recipient of many honors and awards, including honorary degrees from Yale, NYU, and Tufts, and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Philosophical Association.
In 2021, she was awarded the Hannah Arendt Prize for political thought, and the spirit of Arendt seems to be strong this evening.
I must admit, when we invited Jill to speak in this series in March of this year, I assumed it would be to discuss the insights of her book, We the People, on the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. But in August, Sergio alerted me to the fact that she just published a new book on a topic that could not be more timely.
Democracies today face an extraordinary range of challenges, as we know, from the rise of autocratic populists and resurgent ethnonationalism in many regions, to the dangers of accelerating climate change, rising economic inequalities in our societies, and the erosion of traditional multilateral cooperation, sorry.
Yet few issues have become as fraught as the dramatic advances made in artificial intelligence in recent years.
Proponents claim AI will boost economic productivity and accelerate scientific discovery, helping rid the world of poverty and disease, and generate enormous abundance.
But skeptics fear it will destroy jobs and communities, deepen environmental crises, and even erode our ability to think.
And as we know just from events of this summer and the last few weeks, the greatest fear is that it may even lead to human extinction, according to some.
But what are the implications of automation, the spread of machines and AI for liberal democratic politics?
The Rise and Fall of the Artificial State, Professor Lepore's most recent book, newest book, explores these questions over the long arc of decades and centuries. It examines the personalities and motivations of its leading figures in Silicon Valley.
But it also offers an archaeology of the incredibly diverse range of foundational ideas and technological developments that have sown the seeds of our present moment. It probes the complex relations between animals, robots, and humans, and it calls upon citizens to reclaim their political agency.
Jill will make some opening remarks to start our conversation. I'll then join her to explore various themes in her book and the talk before we open the floor to your questions and comments. Please join me in welcoming Professor Jill Lepore.
Jill Lepore 4:34 ↗
You may know that, of course, over the last few weeks some of the wealthiest people in the world have issued dire warnings that humanity is about to become extinct. Those warnings were intended specifically for the US government. Congress was at the time in session.
A few people introduced a piece of legislation known as the AI kill switch bill, whose point was just to sort of provide some we could unplug it at the last minute device. I think most people don't think this would work, but that was voted down. I mean, there was no vote on it. There was a vote to vote on it, and there was no vote taken.
And then Congress thought it's a good time for six weeks' vacation. So Congress is out of session now till after our midterm elections in November.
So what I just kind of want to celebrate is you guys are all here. Let's solve it, you know? This is a good time. It's a good crowd. People have decided, you know, to come out of an evening to think about these issues that, you know, putatively concern our very continuity as a species.
So I want to talk a little bit about why I wrote this book, and then Sanji and I will have a bit of a conversation, but I'm genuinely looking forward to your solutions. I feel like anytime a group of people, you know, good citizens of the world gather together, we should talk about the big questions and we should brainstorm and share ideas. So I'm looking forward right now to start thinking about, I know, here's what I'll suggest.
Because I don't know, I want to welcome suggestions, a to-do list, comments that are maybe action items for this evening, some that you've come with and maybe some that our conversation will inspire.
So I'm a US political historian. I also write a lot about the history of technology. I teach a lot about the history of technology and the relationship between law and technology. And so last year, or I guess two years ago, I was finishing the book before this, We the People, which is a history of the US Constitution, a book I had written in anticipation of the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, which of course fell this year in 2026.
Because I wanted to think about what we should cherish from that founding moment of the United States and how we might kind of lay a yardstick down along a timeline and measure change over time, and, you know, has the United States, has its Constitution met its promise, or have we betrayed the promise of liberal democratic constitutionalism.
So, you know, I spent years writing that book and thinking about, you know, the very specific 18th century origins of the modern democratic nation-state. 1776 wasn't just the year of the Declaration of Independence, it's the year of the first American Constitutions. The states began writing their Constitutions that year. So just the very idea that people could elect representatives to get together to decide how to govern themselves was new in 1776.
And it spread like wildfire around the world in the aftermath of those years. And for all the ways in which constitutional democracies often fall short of the idealism of their founding, I do believe it is the best way that human societies have found to govern themselves.
And as possibly compromised, liable to corruption as such nation-states can be, our very capacity to consent to our own government, to government by consent, is just like a precious inheritance to me that feels increasingly precarious in the 21st century for reasons that a lot of people think about. I mean, political scientists will chronicle democratic backsliding, loss of trust in democratic institutions.
There's been polling that lately, for instance, people tend to trust what they learn from their chatbot more than what they learn from their elected representatives. There's just like a lot of concerning developments around trust, around citizen participation, especially the weakness of civil society. People don't feel kind of bonded to one another as communities.
So, this is, you know, you've been hearing these warnings and cautions and whistleblowing and alarm bell ringing about civil society and democracy for a long time, and constitutions. And in the US, you know, we've been talking for quite a while about what is essentially a rolling constitutional crisis in our country.
But when I got to the end of that book, I really struggled with what to do with an epilogue because the narrative that I told in the book ends in 2016. But I needed an epilogue that would sort of make a gesture toward the future. And I ended up arguing, kind of much to my own surprise because I have quite a bit of faith in 18th century constitutionalism, I ended up arguing that I don't think 18th century constitutions are adequate to address the two biggest challenges of our time.
One is the destruction of the natural world, and the other is the rise of artificial intelligence. And that, you know, we could amend our constitutions, we could revise them, we could have new constitutional conventions and write new constitutions, but I'm not even sure if the constitution as a form, as a mode of government, as a way of establishing fundamental law, can survive these two particular challenges.
And I've been thinking about that recently because just this week, President Trump met with some of these leading tech moguls and agreed to a morally but not legally binding what Trump called constitution, whereby these international corporations that are based in the United States would regulate their AI so that the robots would not kill us all.
And I don't think that is a constitution. I know that's not a constitution. I will go further. That has nothing to do with constitutionalism.
I also don't think it will work. It's just nuts. Let's just look, it's clearly nuts. So if your suggestion in the Q&A part was going to be, I think your president should sign a non-binding agreement with the tech moguls and call it a constitu- No. F. You have failed class.
We need some other solutions on the table. But I think it's very interesting the use of the language of constitutionalism to try to, you know, put a kind of cloak of democratic legitimacy on what is essentially a corrupt economic bargain between the White House and corporate power in the United States. That has consequences for the entire world.
So what I did after finishing that book about the US Constitution was decide I really actually needed to reckon squarely with this particular challenge and try to answer for me the question that really bothers me. Actually, this kind of question I ask about everything in the world, which is like, how did this happen? What the Like, that's my general response to things.
As an illustration of this, I once, I have three kids. And years ago I went on like a trip to, I'm sorry, I'm just always going to tell you dumb stories, but we will get around to the artificial state. I went to a conference and I had to bring a breast pump with me and I was in like a women's room at this conference hotel. That was disgusting and the women's room was also pretty gross.
And we're all in there with our motors and we have our the cone, the horns of plenty attached to our breasts. They're all like pulsing, I'm sorry, I don't freak out the men in the room. We're all extracting milk from our own bodies to freeze for our babies that are miles, hundreds of miles away from ourselves. And that's the kind of moment where I was like looking around, what the actual, you know, how did this happen?
What set of historical circumstances conspired to convince us that we need to be doing this? I ended up writing an article for The New Yorker called Baby Food. That is like one of the things I'm most proud of because it really explains how that happened.
In other words, like I'm a historian, but I'm not like, oh, I'm interested in the Peloponnesian War or George Patton or the rise and fall of Justin Trudeau. Like I'm actually, what the hell? Why are we living this way? These are always my questions.
So I decided I wanted to write a book that tried to answer that question for the weird surrender of our autonomy as human beings to machines in ways that increasingly mean we have abdicated our obligations as citizens, as members of our communities, even as members of our own families, as people who are involved in education. We've surrendered so much of what makes us human to machinery, including we have begun to replace consent of the governed with government by machine.
And I really wanted to understand how that had happened. So I set about an investigation that led me to write this, for me, kind of wacky book. Also it's for me a very short book. Most of my books are really long.
And I wrote it in a kind of headlong sort of fugue state last summer. And I had like a bunch of questions about, you know, look, my husband's a computer scientist. I don't have a problem with computers. Like I don't have a problem with computer scientists. I don't Like I'm fascinated by the latest technology. I'm like a little bit of a gadget fiend. I'm like a Star Trek weird fan. I wrote Star Trek fan fiction when I was a girl. Like I'm a science fiction person.
So I'm not the like, oh, why do we have these machines in our life? Like that's not me. But what I don't understand is the yielding, the surrendering of our autonomy and our humanity.
And so I kind of was really interested in when did that line cross from like, oh, this would be good, really good to count the population so that we could have proportionate representation. Oh, it would be really good to have voting machines so that we can more effectively vote. It would be really good to use the general purpose computer to count the census or to calculate the election returns, or to measure popular public opinion, or even to predict the outcome of the next election.
Like, all the ways that we might think of tools from like early calculating and tabulating machines to later more sophisticated single-purpose and then general-purpose computers, makes a lot of sense to use those in ways that might make the running of a government more efficient, for instance.
Like, we, you know, in the United States we have a social security program that dates to 1935. We all have a social security number. It is used to keep track of our contributions on our paychecks to a pot of money that is available for people who lose their jobs, or are disabled, and is available to us when we retire. That requires a lot of data management. Makes sense that you're going to use a computer to do that, right?
So, allocating benefits in a social welfare state, tracking voting, there's a lot of reasons you could use those tools. That's not the artificial state, right? That's just like the administrative state. Like, we're just kind of, it's just bureaucracy, using these tools for bureaucracy.
So what this book tries to answer is like at what point did something change? At what point did like just using these tools for the efficiency of running a democratic government, where we are still voting about, well, what should social security benefits look like? Like, what would veterans' benefits look like? What is the tax rate going to be? We as citizens influence those decisions, and then these machines are used to implement them. What changed?
And so I'll really only talk here just because I don't know, I've already talked about breast milk, so we've really covered most things.
I just want to talk a little bit about the rise of the artificial state, and what I see as having happened in my lifetime that I was surprised to find out about when I went and researched it in the archives. So, I think if you think about the 1960s in California, when California was still mainly avocado groves, and was really the epicenter of the countercultural movement, right? The back to the land movement, you know, psychedelic drugs, the free speech movement in Berkeley, California, and the anti-war movement was really strong in California.
There was, it's like surfer culture, think of the Beach Boys, like California was this kind of alternative place, and where countercultural vibes were kind of running the place. But at the same time, it was growing to be the epicenter of the growing electronics and computer industry. And those two things kind of married in a really interesting way. There's a wonderful book about this called From Counterculture to Cyberculture.
And what kind of comes out of that era is it's sometimes called the California ideology. It's a commitment politically to libertarianism. Like we just don't need government. I mean, some of those countercultural communes were really anarchic, and they really were anarchists, right? So, but kind of California gets this kind of real libertarian commitment, and also a kind of worship of the machine, the tools that will build a new utopia.
And so you then sort of see the industry grow up over the '70s and into the '80s at a time when Ronald Reagan, who had been the governor of California in the 1960s, leads a conservative revolution all the way to the White House. He's elected in 1980. And Reagan's whole emphasis when he runs for and becomes president is he's going to get rid of regulation, regulation of business that is thwarting American growth, leading to the great malaise of the 1970s.
He's also specifically interested in a kind of Milton Friedman libertarianism that kind of wants to overturn environmental regulations that were put in place in the US in the '60s and the early '70s. So his whole administration's motto was regulation stifles growth and stifles innovation. And that's particularly with reference to the electronics and computer industry of California, which is the engine of the American economy then, and it is now, much more so now.
So that when Apple Computer releases the Macintosh in 1984, their whole message of that computer's release, we don't need governments involved in our personal computer or in this industry in any way, because our machinery itself is going to advance democracy, because it's going to be personally empowering.
In the way that like the kind of counterculture was all about like your personal empowerment, like in your self-actualization, the personal computer would be personally empowering. So this was a kind of big feature of how the early Apple was received into the world.
And when you, by the time you get to the 1990s and the debates over the opening of the internet, now California continues, and people who are involved in like those early decisions, they're all suffused with a spirit of libertarianism.
The idea will be, look, we're creating this whole new world, this virtual world, and it should be a perfectly lawless place, and that will be a way to celebrate individual freedom, that will advance democracy, we'll all be perfectly realized, self-realized individuals, and there will be a kind of harmony of humankind that will be free from the corruption of ordinary politics.
And that's why the internet that you get, which is the internet that we provided, was the internet that has no rules, right? That's kind of the US government's commitment to the internet is there shall be no rules on the internet because it will be a libertarian heaven, the dream of Californians.
And that set of arguments about the way technologies ought to have a relationship with the government is extended further when you get to like Facebook is started in 2004, Twitter in I think 2006. Neither of which really pick up until the iPhone, I think, which is 2007, but all of those also are rolled out with the idea there should be no rules. This is the perfect expression of individual self-actualization. Government has no place here.
You know, Facebook's early mission statement is about connecting all of humanity. Its promise, as had been the promise with the personal computer and the internet, that it will somehow magically advance democracy, is the promise that is offered for social media. That's why we have the social media that we have and not a different social media.
You know, other countries have other rules about privacy protection and datafication. But the kind of wildly unregulated nature of social media is a consequence of Congress having decided in the 1980s, the US Congress, the stuff they're inventing there out in California, we barely understand it, and we certainly shouldn't be regulating it because we no longer believe in regulating that entire industry.
By now there's emerged a kind of cult of the boy genius. You know, these, I call them the merchant princes of Silicon Valley, these sort of boy men. They wear sneakers and jeans and t-shirts and hoodies and baseball caps, which was maybe cuter when they were 19, but now they're 60. But their boyishness is a whole part of the shtick, you know.
And so with the rollout of artificial intelligence, of course, dates back to the 1950s, but with the great leap forward with ChatGPT in 2022, it's just a rerun of all of the same old stories. Oh, we're smarter than you. We are the boy geniuses of Silicon Valley. There shall be no laws here. You can trust us. If you were to regulate our industry, you would halt the incredible acceleration, the pace of our development of these fantastic new tools that will be good for democracy, and we control the future of humanity.
And so now we're at this point of like we have this lawless world where now these guys are like, maybe you're all going to die. And people are like, but how did that happen? Well, I'm trying to tell you how that happened.
It is because the US Congress refused to do its work. Didn't study these tools, didn't take the initiative to figure out how to legislate around them, didn't represent the interests of the American citizens. So the brokenness and dysfunction of American politics just has tremendous ripple. Oh, this is a surprise to you Canadians that the things that are wrong in our country have bad effects for you.
But it's not just you, right? These bad effects go around the world. The reason these tools have not been regulated, are not safer than they are, are not more likely to promote democracy, and are in fact more likely to promote authoritarianism is because the US Congress doesn't work.
So the other consequence of that is that these corporations have begun to act like nation-states themselves. That they are actually promoting what I call the artificial state, which is government by machine. And part of the way you see that sort of happen, I don't think they set out with that in mind. It wasn't like some conspiracy of like Sam Altman and Elon Musk one dark night. It's just that power was granted to them without restraint again and again and again.
They're like the worst way you would raise a teenager. Then you've created a monster. He's 26 and he's terrifying. Like that's kind of the way, like there were never any limits on their actions, and they were worshipped, right? It's just like a kind of story of bad parenting ultimately.
But like some clues about that, like when people remember in 2015 with Brexit and then 2016 with Donald Trump's election, there was a scandal, the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which Facebook, you know, whistleblowers came out. There were a lot of
Revelations about misuse of people's private data to try to manipulate people politically. It was one of many, many scandals that have come out about Facebook. And Zuckerberg was called to Washington to testify before Congress. And what he ultimately really said was, you know, don't worry, we'll take care of it. And then Facebook started its own Supreme Court.
And the thing is, a company cannot have a Supreme Court. A Supreme Court, a judiciary, is put in place by a constitution that is written and ratified by the people. The Supreme Court is appointed by an executive or elected by the people, can be impeached by the people, can be removed from office. There's just nothing about a company having a Supreme Court that makes any sense. But it is like, don't worry, you don't need to make any laws for us. We'll make our own laws. We'll have our own judiciary. Don't worry. Anthropic earlier this year announced that it had written a constitution for Claude. Well, I know it's funny.
Claude wrote it. I don't know how you Canadians wrote your constitution. Well, actually I do. But a constitution is written by delegates elected by the people for the purpose of drafting fundamental law, which will then be returned to the people for their inspection and approval. And if they approve it by way of ratifying it, it can be amended by any number of means including popular referendum. I'm just going to tell you one story about the last time I was in Toronto. I went to some dinner party, and some drunk guy next to me was telling me how he wrote Canada's constitution. Was there one in the '80s? And he was like, I don't understand you Americans, how you think your founding fathers were divinely inspired and that, you know, they were all geniuses. 'Cause I tell you what, we were just drunk.
I like that. Anyway, but still that's a constitution with legitimacy, right? Claude's constitution, it's just not a constitution. That's not what a constitution is. You can call it that if you want to cloak it in democratic legitimacy, but it doesn't make it a constitution. You know, the other example from OpenAI comes from Sam Altman. Altman has said on a number of occasions that he thinks an AI president of the United States would be better than a human one. Now, you might say, let's say a better human one. But his point was, look, he said, and I quote, it would be awesome.
Because it would be like, I don't know, imagine an arachnid with its tendrils in each of us, and it's constantly getting your feelings and your views on any issue and calculating what the majority wishes and adjusting its policymaking, and that would be the perfect form of democracy. And if you've ever studied democratic theory or even ever lived in a democracy, you know that's actually not how democracy works. Like we elect representatives, right? We have a representative democracy. We don't have a giant spider, an electronic spider.
So I think it gives you some illustration of the way that these tech moguls, in the absence of any judicial or legislative action to represent the interest of the people relative to what these corporations might want, they have, you know, cloaked themselves in some of the garments of democracy, the language of democracy, of constitutional democracy, and yet never subjected themselves to any kind of democratic process.
And I will say people sometimes say, well, aren't all, you know, you're a historian, maybe that's just not that weird. A lot, you know, in the Gilded Age corporations had huge power, like the robber barons and the trusts and the railroad owners and Standard Oil and these big corporations. And that's absolutely true. But most people in the United States think that AI will bring more harm than benefit. And I believe that's now true in Canada, just as a matter of popular opinion.
Now, they may be wrong. Like we may find that it will bring many more benefits than harm, or we could maybe divide it into more categories than just AI. Like I think most of us have a sense of what's meant by that term. Although in the United States now we're required to call it super intelligence. It's just one of Trump's many decrees. It's like a branding opportunity. I think he's going to make us call it Trump intelligence soon, which would be an interesting turn of events. I swear to God that could happen. I'm not even, I wish I was kidding. Um, where was I? I was talking about, I have completely forgotten where I was. Democratic processes.
I mean, that's, you know, what this dinner party with the tech moguls last week to say, like, we have a morally binding constitution. Congress did actually just say we don't know what to do and went home. So you could say, well, Congress first abandoned its obligation to do anything. So it was useful that the president stepped in, and, you know, God bless if that's your view of the matter. But in any event, you know, the tech moguls supposedly called, please regulate us, please regulate us, please stop us from killing the entire human race. But they're happy, like, by regulation they mean they'll have a dinner party with Trump and come up with a gentleman's agreement. That is not a commitment to democracy.
Oh, I know what I was saying. I was like, this is not the same as how people have received other transformative technologies. And artificial intelligence is incredibly exciting. Like intellectually, it's really tremendously exciting, and I want to be excited about all that it offers by way of new avenues of knowledge and invention and discovery and experimentation. But so it is a huge transformation. But say for instance, so was electricity. And I can tell you, if you have grandparents who lived in a rural area of a province before electrification, they were desperate for electricity. They were desperate for running water. They were desperate for radio signals, radio towers, so that they could be part of a network of communication. People were desperate to have telephones just even in their towns, no less their house.
Like, there's not a blanket objection to technology that might be transformative, right? If this was a better technology being brought out in ways that, say, electricity was brought out, you know, with the rural electrification projects in the United States were hugely transformative. They were government-run programs, and they were about making it possible for rural people to lead better lives and to have more access to public health and to have longer days if they needed longer days. All kinds of reasons that you would want electricity in your home. But people didn't distrust the government that was bringing electricity.
So don't let yourself be duped by like, oh, people always balk at new big tools, 'cause that's just not true. There's something about the abdication of the legislative power of our federal government and our federal government's general dysfunction over the last really half century that has allowed these American companies to develop tools that could be great and could still be great, but to develop them in ways that have been injurious to civil society, to people's communities, to communities through the destruction of local journalism, to people's mental health, to children's education, and to politics, and have undermined democracies here and around the world. That's why I wrote the book, and now I would love to sit down with Andre and talk somewhere about it.
Host 34:43 ↗
There's so much to talk about, but there's so many of you here. So what I'm going to do is I'm going to try to think of three big questions, just to kind of get us going. And so as Jill was saying, think of all the solutions to all the problems that she sort of laid out.
So I want to talk a little bit about the book, as you talked sort of about the book, but there were a few things, and you talked about what you described as the merchant princes of Silicon Valley, sort of the arrested development of these boy-men. And in your remarks, you talked about how many of them, and earlier in the day we were talking for another recording of a podcast, so, you know, they're individuals, they have different views. Dario Amodei has a different view from Sam Altman versus Marc Andreessen and so on. But there was a commonality in that there's a tendency, and you laid it out here really well, of an attraction to techno-libertarianism, that counterculture combined with this belief in technological salvation.
But the other one that's really fascinating in the book is how many of them, as Jill writes in the book, grew up reading science fiction, Cold War science fiction in particular, Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, and so on. And what's really striking, you say in the book, is that many of the tales of these figures were cautionary tales, that technology itself could be dangerous and could actually encourage tyranny. Right? So there was sort of a lot of these could be dystopian tales. And yet you say that a lot of the figures that we read about now, Mr. Musk, Mr. Altman, and others, when they read these books, they didn't read them as cautionary tales. They read them as instruction manuals, that here's a world of spaceships and robots and cyborgs that we should create. So that's really fascinating. Can you tell me a little bit about that?
Jill Lepore 36:44 ↗
Yeah, I mean, it is perplexing, although I have an explanation for it. I mean, if you think of it like H.G. Wells, 'cause a lot of people have read H.G. Wells, maybe you read The Time Machine or War of the Worlds, like they're pretty widely read. If you read those books as kids, you'd be like, oh, they're like rollicking fun adventures of a future world, and all the gadgets are very cool. Like the actual time machine is really cool. The rockets in War of the Worlds, really cool. So it's kind of like swashbuckling, right? Like it'd be like reading The Three Musketeers or something, right? Just maybe indistinguishable from other adventure tales of adventure.
And you might even think like, I'd really love to build a time machine when I grow up, or I'd really like to build a rocket when I grow up and go travel through space. But if you were an adult and you read H.G. Wells's The Time Machine, War of the Worlds, you probably by then would know that H.G. Wells was a very active and ardent socialist and anti-imperialist. And The Time Machine is a socialist manifesto, and War of the Worlds is an argument against imperialism. I mean, he mentions it in the foreword to the book. Like it's an argument against the British Empire's invasion of Tanzania. So you would have a different view. You'd be like, okay, well, you know, the time machine and the rockets, they're just literary devices to get you to think about the weirdness of the social order, economic order of the world in which Wells lived, right? They work as parables, they're cautionary tales.
So I think these guys read stuff when they were kids, and I don't think they carried it into their adulthood, right? Which you don't, like, whatever, like the way you read books as kids, like plenty of books I read as kids, I sure had no real clue what they were about. But then these people went on to build those worlds. Do you know what I mean? Like so where Isaac Asimov has this whole future world that he creates in which there are robots everywhere, they're manufactured by a company called U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men. But actually in Asimov's world, robots are not allowed on the planet Earth because they're so dangerous.
Like, you know, Musk is a huge Asimov fan, as is like Peter Thiel and these guys, and I was like, actually, but your chief inspiration for building robots, like Musk wants to release like a million Optimus robots in 2027, like he wants there to be more humanoid robots on the planet than humans by 2050. But your chief inspiration for that is Isaac Asimov who created a future world in which robots were not allowed on Earth because they're too dangerous. Like that's just a weird, it's a weird kind of marooned in your childhood fantasy life.
But you know, sometimes when I think about that, I just feel like my kids were all into Dungeons and Dragons, and you know, the kid who's the Dungeons and Dragons master, and everyone else is just like rolling the dice. It's like, but we're in their board game, you know, and that's why it matters. Like I'm not interested in making fun of someone who isn't a good reader of science fiction, except that they've actually built that world.
Host 40:21 ↗
And what's really ironic is today we worry as educators and just others as citizens that the reliance on these technologies are actually reducing our capacity and our ability to read and to interpret. And so in an odd way you're saying like they didn't learn how to do close reading or it somehow...
Jill Lepore 40:41 ↗
And they don't think we need to bother to read, right? We can have machines read for us.
Host 40:45 ↗
Right. Second question. You started by talking about your previous book, We the People, and you asked a very provocative question, which I think a lot of people do. Can constitutionalism, that model of constitutional democracy, and particularly it's the constitutionalism, right? The sort of the fact that, and countries are different, regimes are different, constitutions are different, but you know, the basic model of post-1945 constitutional democracy is that we want to check the power of the state through separation of powers, checks and balances in the US system. We want to slow things down. And then that leads to great critique of democracy.
Someone like, you know, the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt would say had a critique with the problem of democracy, parliamentary democracies, that's the problem, it slows things down. You know, it's inefficient, obstructive, and so on. And you asked the question at the beginning of your remarks, can constitutionalism survive these two great, let's not call them threats 'cause you said those, well, one is a threat, climate change. But you said there's these two great challenges, AI and climate change. And in your remarks you talked about the abdication of responsibility by the US Congress over half a century in this neoliberal era. And that story is one that we know quite well.
But I was wondering if there's a deeper challenge. I sort of thinking, you know, for instance, if I think of different democratic orders today that want or seem to want to do the right thing, I think of the EU. So it has, you know, it has promulgated many laws on privacy, on AI safety in 2024. And I think it was just this week in the New York Times that said, well, it drafted a law, part of the reason it doesn't have much teeth is it wasn't fully implemented, there weren't enough resources, none of people were appointed, budgets weren't spent properly. But part of it was, and this is the question, that the speed of development of AI is so fast.
At least this is the claim or the perception, that our constitutional processes and the things that we value, of debate, of deliberation, it's just too slow to deal with this challenge. How do you think about that dilemma?
Jill Lepore 43:16 ↗
Actually, I wrote an article for the New Yorker about that last week called 'Is AI Above the Law,' in which I tried to demonstrate that, I mean, there's in the law sort of like I sometimes call the pacing problem, right? Not even think about constitution but just statutory law, like it takes longer to change a law than it does to invent something new. And so the response of the law is generally, well, we don't need to change it for new technologies because we have these very broad doctrines like fraud is fraud, copyright is copyright, liability is liability, a tort is a tort. You just use these general purpose laws and doctrines and you apply them to the new technology. Because after all, what is a car but a faster horse?
So there was this big debate in the 1990s when the field of so-called cyber law was born, where a lot of lawyers were like, 'Wow, a whole new realm of human activity. We need a body of law for that. Let's call it cyberlaw, and let's think about what we should do.' And people who disagreed with that said, there's a famous judge wrote an article called 'The Law of the Horse,' in which he said, you know, 'No, we didn't need a new law for automobiles.' Which apparently is just not true. We actually, all the laws of the road, licensing laws, driving education requirements, insurance liability, we do have laws for cars. But, you know, we'll eventually get to like if we need new laws for new technologies, just be patient.
The refrain of this law of the horse article is, keep doing what you're doing. Don't invent something new because the dignity of the law, the virtue of the law, is its stability. And it would introduce instability to be constantly updating it to keep pace with the new technologies. And I think that was, in fairness to Congress regarding its inaction, has been kind of swallowing that argument, right? So you would say now, or the Times would say now, like that the EU's 2024 AI Act, most of it was drafted before ChatGPT was released in 2022. So even adding stuff about generative AI, they had to add it kind of at the last minute, and they have no ability to implement any of it.
On the other hand, if that stuff had been building on a body of law that had been written since the 1990s with the opening of the internet, it's like, 'Oh, now it's too late because it's moving too fast.' No, it's that we did nothing for 40 years. Do you know what I mean? Like, I think it's looking in the wrong place in terms of who to hold accountable. It's not that it isn't a problem. It is a problem, you know, the technological change happens more quickly. But there have been people all along arguing for, like my colleague of mine at the Harvard Law School, Jonathan Zittrain, wrote an article several years ago called, you know, I think it's called like 'We Need Agentic AI Laws Now.' You know, it was before anyone outside of, you know, tech people were talking about agentic AI. And now, you know, three years later we have the Hugging Face, you know, and all these other rogue AI. And you know, he was calling for these laws years ago, but it's the tech companies that have been saying, just give it time. Like, it's too soon. It's too soon right now. It's still changing. Like as if it's going to someday settle down.
So it's not that it's not a problem, but I refuse to concede that sort of thing. It's just too bad these tools move so quickly. It doesn't make any sense to me.
Host 46:48 ↗
Yeah, no, I didn't mean to imply that we should just throw our hands up, but it was the idea that there's like an asymmetry of almost of time and speed, and which like, as you know, the motto, as you said, 'move fast and break things' is a motto. And then for the law and for constitutions and for political institutions, it's no, stability, institutionalization. You know, we want things to be embedded.

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APA

Lepore, J. (2026, October 29). Jill Lepore | The Artificial State [Interview transcript]. Toronto Public Library. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3165753/

MLA

Jill Lepore. "Jill Lepore | The Artificial State." Toronto Public Library, 29 Oct. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3165753/.

BibTeX
@misc{lepore2026_3165753,
  author       = {Jill Lepore},
  title        = {Jill Lepore | The Artificial State},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Toronto Public Library. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {oct},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3165753/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}